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Municipal Identity as Property
Christopher J. Tyson*
Abstract
Detroit is bankrupt, and very little of the theorizing and
editorializing about this watershed event has contemplated municipal
boundary law as a contributing factor. To the extent that it has, the
analysis fails to grasp how essential municipal boundaries are to the
creation of economic and social value in the modem metropolis. It has
been almost 20 years since Richard Briffault, Gerald Frug, and Richard
Ford released their path-breaking scholarship on the municipal boundary
problem, yet metropolitan regions continue to fragment in much the
same way Detroit did throughout the twentieth century.
The persistent fragmentation evident in many metropolitan areas
raises familiar questions about the meaning and function of municipal
boundaries and how local government law should respond. At the center
of the contemporary metropolitan boundary problem are the localist
ambitions of the cityhood and annexation movements. Their appeal
underscores the extent to which the politics around metropolitan area
location, autonomy, and identity (specifically in relation to the suburbs)
are understood, expressed and defended by laymen and courts alike in
the rhetoric and logic of property rights. The relationship between
private property rights and the perceived right to autonomous local
government has taken on popular meanings that, while not always
grounded in actual law, do have a real impact on politics. That perceived
entitlement forms the ideological basis for what is essentially a socially
constructed property right in municipal identity. Municipal identity as
property is largely a reflection of the high-stakes nature of contemporary
* Associate Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University. B.Arch., Howard University; M.P.P., Harvard Kennedy School; J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank the participants of
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suburban identity. Suburban residents feel particularly threatened by the
prospect of being swallowed up by their metropolitan area central city,
or, even worse, ending up in an unincorporated, undervalued location.
The extent to which residing in a particular municipality is understood as
highly consequential for wealth building, quality of life, family security,
and status is a key feature of the contemporary suburban identity and
experience. Battles over municipal boundaries reveal the ways in which
suburban residents express what amounts to a deeply felt entitlement to
separate government.
While notions of municipal identity as property reflect the
cumulative weight of twentieth-century social and economic
developments, the courts have played a role as well. Legal rhetoric and
legal reasoning are essential components of the property rights
expectations that municipal identity fosters. This Article explores how
municipal boundary law, social developments, and jurisprudence have
bolstered a perceived property right in municipal identity and its role in
shaping the modem metropolis.
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INTRODUCTION

The imaginary line defining a city's corporate limits cannot corral the
influence of municipal actions. A city's decisions inescapably affect
individuals living immediately outside its borders.'

1. Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 69 (1978).

696
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[M]uch in modem America depends on where you draw boundaries,
and who's inside and who's outside.
Who is included in the social contract? If "Detroit" is defined as the
larger metropolitan area that includes its suburbs, "Detroit" has
enough money to provide all its residents with adequate if not good
public services, without falling into bankruptcy. Politically, it would
come down to a question of whether the more affluent areas of this
"Detroit" were willing to subsidize the poor inner-city through their
tax dollars, and help it rebound. That's an awkward question
2 that the
face.
to
have
not
rather
probably
would
areas
affluent
more

The municipal boundary problem presented by legal scholars almost
a generation ago continues to be a persistent regulating force in local
Some have argued that
government law and metropolitan life.3
metropolitan fragmentation is at the root of the city of Detroit's
bankruptcy filing. 4 Quite possibly no other metropolitan region in the
United States offers as compelling of a window into the consequences of
metropolitan fragmentation than Detroit.

While there are differing

2. Robert Reich, Detroit,and the Bankruptcy of America's Social Contract, INST.
FORNEW ECON. THINKING (Aug. 1, 2013), http://bit.ly/llAyHtp.
3. See Richard Briffault, Who Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local
Governments, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 339, 390-97 (1993) [hereinafter Briffault, Who Rules at
Home?] (discussing the roles of boundary change for local government voting rights);
Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction),97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 85254 (1999). See generally Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in
Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1996) [hereinafter Briffault, Local
Government Boundary Problem]; Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115
HARV. L. REV. 1763 (2002).

4. See Bob Kleine, Bankruptcy Won't Fix Detroit, HUFFINGTON POST (July 26,
2013, 11:18 AM), http://huff.to/lat6ekp. Kleine stated:
A fourth option [to avoid bankruptcy] would be tax base sharing or regional
government. This is done in many other states, and Governor Milliken
proposed a tax base sharing program back in the 1970s, that if enacted would
probably have prevented bankruptcy. Michigan's archaic annexation laws
encourage rent-seeking from those who use the city's services for business or
pleasure, but choose to live outside the city and pay lower or no taxes.
Id.; see also Reich, supra note 2. Reich noted:
[T]here's a more basic story here, and it's being replicated across America:
Americans are segregating by income more than ever before. Forty years ago,
most cities (including Detroit) had a mixture of wealthy, middle-class, and poor
residents. Now, each income group tends to lives [sic] separately, in its own
city-with its own tax bases and philanthropies that support, at one extreme,
excellent schools, resplendent parks, rapid-response security, efficient
transportation, and other first-rate services; or, at the opposite extreme, terrible
schools, dilapidated parks, high crime, and third-rate services. The geopolitical divide has become so palpable that being wealthy in America today
means not having to come across anyone who isn't.
Id. But see Alec MacGillis, The Four Dumb Things People Are Saying About Detroit,
NEW REPUBLIC (July 19, 2013), http://bit.ly/ffHzwLX (arguing that too much territory,
not a lack of tightly drawn boundaries, led to Detroit's unsustainable infrastructure costs).
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opinions about the relative impact of municipal boundary formation and
reformation on Detroit's fiscal woes, it is hard to dispute that these forces
have played a key role in the city's current fiscal challenges. Moreover,
it is hard to ignore the links between emerging developments in
metropolitan areas and the influence of state boundary law.
The municipal boundary problem, however, neither begins nor ends
with the story of Detroit's bankruptcy. It has much broader implications
for metropolitan life than are captured in issue of municipal insolvency.
The municipal boundary problem and its impact on metropolitan
development, governance, and society is illustrated in the anti-annexation
and cityhood movements that have recently animated politics in several
metropolitan regions across the country. As the logic of privatization
and anti-statism increasingly color the sociocultural context within which
individuals and groups are conceptualizing notions of community, there
is a diminishing appetite for the redistributive obligations of sharing
municipal territory with dissimilarly situated others.
There has emerged a sense of entitlement, urgency, and heightened
awareness of risk avoidance within communities seeking separate
municipal identity. These sentiments have been building for a few
decades now but are often viewed as related to local politics rather than
indicative of something deeper in the national culture. Something deeper
is at play, however, and it is illustrated in the tenor and tone of local
boundary battles over the past two decades. For instance, in the mid1990s Houston's annexation of the bedroom suburb of Kingwood ignited
a boundary battle that ultimately changed Texas boundary law.
Kingwood residents saw the annexation as a losing proposition and after
the annexation became effective, some Kingwood residents reported that
higher fees for services offset the drop in their property taxes.' They
filed a lawsuit alleging that the annexation deprived them of voting
rights, due process, and equal protection under the law.6 A state
legislator characterized the issue as related to the "'fundamental rights of
self-determination and consent of the governed[.]' 7
Kingwood
ultimately lost the legal fight and relations between Houston and
Kingwood officials became even more contentious. 8 Motorists in the
area sported "Free Kingwood" bumper stickers and described the
community as "occupied territory" to the Houston Chronicle. 9
5. See Peter S. Canellos, Land Grab: OutragedResidents of Houston Suburb Fight
City's Annexation, Cif. TRIB., Aug. 16, 1997, http://bit.ly/lgMxRrh.
6. See generally Harris v. City of Hous., 151 F.3d 186 (5th Cir. 1998).
7. Canellos, supra note 5.
8. See Harris,151 F.3dat 190-91.
9. See Julie Mason, Kingwood Municipal Utility Districts Must SurrenderAssets to
the City, Hous. CHRON., Apr. 30, 1997, at A23. For a broader discussion of the
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More recently in North Carolina, a years-long effort successfully
rewrote that state's annexation laws.' 0 Cloaked in the rhetoric of
fundamental rights, self-determination, and the Constitution, organized
groups of North Carolinians fought against the ability of metropolitan
area central cities to extend their boundaries over the objection of
property owners residing in the areas proposed for annexation. 1 For
many, the state's annexation laws came to be viewed with hostility and
contempt, and the sentiments of ordinary citizens provided a telling
window into how critical many view boundary control. 2 One resident
remarked about the state's former involuntary annexation laws, "'Most
communities expect rational discussion where their
voice matters...
13
[but] [t]hey drag them in kicking and screaming.""
Annexation battles are not the only site of the municipal boundary
problem. Over the past few years, "cityhood"' 14 movements have
threatened to alter the governance structures in metropolitan areas such
as Atlanta and Baton Rouge, Louisiana. A cityhood movement has
developed in metropolitan Atlanta's Fulton and DeKalb counties
consisting of citizen-led nonprofit organizations raising money to study
municipal incorporation options for communities in unincorporated
areas.' 5 While concerns over service delivery and amenities in
unincorporated areas of the county are a driving force, county residents
are also aware that incorporating as a city will redirect and concentrate
their tax dollars on only the citizens within the new boundaries. In
characterizing the logic behind the burgeoning cityhood movements, a
news article on the relationship between Atlanta's suburban communities
and the unincorporated areas used the analogy that "[i]f [one community]
is Croatia16 and [another] is Slovenia, you don't want to end up as
Kosovo.'

Kingwood annexation controversy and involuntary annexation in Houston, see also
Christopher J. Tyson, Localism and Involuntary Annexation: Reconsidering Approaches
to New Regionalism, 87 TUL. L. REV.297, 318-25 (2012).
10. See Tyson, supra note 9, at 313.
11. See id.
12. See Judith Welch Wegner, North Carolina's Annexation Wars: Whys,
Wherefores, and What Next, 91 N.C. L. REV. 165, 168-69 (2012); Rob Christensen,
Many Hail North Carolina Annexation Law, NEWS OBSERVER (Mar. 27, 2011),
http://bit.ly/I fuTKpU.
13. Christensen, supranote 12.
14. The term "cityhood" applies to actions by bands of citizens seeking to
incorporate territory into another municipality as a way of achieving separate
governmental autonomy, typically relative to a nearby central city within an existing
metropolis.
15. See Scott Henry, Land Rush Continues for Proposed New DeKalb Cities,
ATLANTA MAG. (June 24, 2013, 4:33 PM), http://bit.ly/I fuUgnL.
16. Id.
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Regionalists, new regionalists, urbanists, and many others have long
warned of the pitfalls of a fragmented metropolis. 17 A handful of
governments have taken heed and pursued approaches to regionalize
metropolitan governance through annexation, inter-regional agreements,
or other governance innovations.18 Increasingly, however, ordinary
citizens want their own separate governments. While they embrace
metropolitan life by moving to metropolitan areas, they simultaneously
reject it with demands for separate local government autonomy within
the metropolis. This identity crisis is not as much of a non sequitur as it
seems. When viewed within in the context of how property, location,
and identity are intertwined, it is plausible to reconcile these seemingly
divergent forces under a guiding logic organized around selective
redistribution and an almost paranoid regard for property values.
People care about property. They also care about where they live.
Indeed, the regard for property is inextricably related to the regard for
location. Whether through resisting annexation or calling for new
municipal incorporations, local interest groups often use the tool of local
government boundary law to express what they perceive as a
fundamental right to protect their property values and express individual
or collective self-determination through forming or moving to (or
preventing their being subsumed by) a separate location or territorially
based identity. The risk of annexation by a metropolitan area central city
or failure to incorporate as a suburban jurisdiction is often
conceptualized and expressed in terms that imply that something
fundamental is being threatened by state or local government action.
This sense of contingency colors common perceptions about the range of
available options for metropolitan organization and their impact on
individual life chances.
Characterizing an annexed area as "occupied territory," as in
Kingwood, or analogizing an unincorporated community to war-torn
Eastern Europe, as in Atlanta, is pretty hyperbolic. But the invocation of
these metaphors speaks to the perceived high stakes of an action or
inaction in choosing a location in the metropolis. If the stakes are
perceived to be high, not only must extraordinary action be taken to
17. For a discussion of regionalism, new regionalism, and metropolitan
fragmentation, see generally Tyson, supra note 9. Metropolitan fragmentation is a
controversial issue and many scholars have long made the case for increased
fragmentation. This Article is grounded in an anti-fragmentation frame and argues from
that normative position. For a discussion of the virtues of fragmentation, see generally
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Public Expenditure, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416
(1956) (arguing that regional fragmentation promotes inter-municipal competition and
provides options for highly mobile consumer-voters). See also generally PAUL E.
PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981).
18. See Tyson, supra note 9, at 303-25.
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protect the rights at risk, but preemptive actions are also necessary to
mitigate against future risks.
In another article, Localism and Involuntary Annexation:
Reconsidering Approaches to New Regionalism,19 I introduced the idea
of municipal identity as property as an essential underpinning of the
popular and political backlash to involuntary annexation. 20 The term
"municipal identity" refers to all of the devices of local government law
that allow territorially defined groups to establish formal or quasigovernments that ultimately demarcate separate territory, establish
separate and often oppositional identity, formalize autonomous
governance structures, and limit the redistributional impact of their tax
dollars. 2 1 The notion of municipal identity as property, however, is not
limited to controversies over the relatively rare involuntary annexation
regimes that are highlighted in that article. Rather, it reflects broad
currents in contemporary society related to property, territory, identity,
economics, and local politics.
"Municipal identity as property" metaphorically characterizes the
ways in which the desire for separate local government has come to be
popularly understood as a fundamental right. This extends beyond the
availability of municipal incorporation under state law-it is something
more existential. Increasingly, metropolitan area residents are driven to
deploy state boundary law in service of very provincial, privatized aims
to the detriment of exploring more regionalized, collective options for
managing community in metropolitan space. Scholars have explored the

19. Christopher J. Tyson, Localism and Involuntary Annexation: Reconsidering
Approaches to New Regionalism, 87 TUL. L. REv. 297 (2012).
20. Id. at 301. "Municipal" here is used broadly to encompass not only general
purpose local governments, but also the increasingly dominant special governments,
quasi-cities, and common interest communities. For purposes of this Article, I collapse
these governance structures to explore municipal identity as their treatment in this Article
largely addresses the manner in which they impact traditional understandings about
property law and identity formation.
21. In addition to actual suburban governments, the term also encompasses the
growing reality of common interest communities where local government factors are
prioritized in a way that fragments metropolitan territory. The rise in common interest
communities is not addressed in this Article. Common interest communities often are
created inside existing cities or suburban municipalities, but in many cases do attempt to
opt out of the municipalities' services, such as policing, sewage, and sanitation. Of the
126 million housing units in the United States in 2006, approximately 23 million were
located in common interest communities, and of the total resident population of 298
million people, approximately 57 million lived in those communities, or 18% of the
housing units and 19% of the population. For more information on the rise of common
interest communities, see WAYNE S. HYATT & SUSAN F. FRENCH, COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS ON COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 3-6 (2d
ed. 2008).
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municipal boundary problem in considerable depth. 2 Municipal identity
is a big deal. Its increasing importance is driven by how individuals and
groups conceptualize location risk and respond to the zeitgeist that
suggests that wealth creation and life chances are tied to location in
extremely consequential ways. Municipal identity as property provides a
useful frame for examining the manner in which social developments and
the law have reified and legitimated broadly held expectations about the
ability of individuals and groups to withdraw from the redistributive
obligations and legacy burdens of cities.
In both theory and jurisprudence, the law has been instrumental in
providing the context for notions of location risk.
Property is
fundamentally about establishing relationships between people with
regard to things. Municipal boundaries, in many states, function in a
manner that establishes relationships between metropolitan residents
with regard to metropolitan territory. Cities, and the metropolitan
regions they make up, operate in large measure to facilitate connections
and the redistribution of resources across a defined territory. While
everyone within the metropolis has generally unfettered access to all of
the territory, not all benefit or benefit equally from how the territory is
legally defined and ordered.
Furthermore, the notion of municipal identity as property
underscores the tension between a private or ownership view of property
and a social or community view of property.2 3 It ultimately undermines
any opportunity to reconceptualize metropolitan governance in a manner
that acknowledges and accounts for the interdependence of the various
communities and constituencies within a metropolitan area. If the right
to municipal location has, in the public's consciousness, developed into a
constructive set of property rights, then it follows that the corresponding
sociopolitical context and legal meaning require it be afforded the most
important and exalted constitutional protection-or something close to it.
When we understand municipal identity in this manner, we can
understand clearly the lengths to which individuals and society as a
whole are willing to go to protect and preserve what is perceived to be a
set of property rights. We can also recognize how courts have

22. See generally Michelle Wilde Anderson, Mapped Out of Local Democracy, 62
STAN. L. REV. 931 (2010); Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 3;
Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter:
Addressing the Barriersto New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985 (2000); Frug, supra note
3; Christopher J. Tyson, Annexation and the Mid-Size Metropolis: New Insights in the
Age of Mobile Capital,73 U. Prrr. L. REV. 505 (2012).
23. See generally ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE COMMON GOOD (2003); Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 75 (2010).
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incorporated this thinking into decisions affecting the course of
metropolitan development.
Here, the discussion started in Localism andInvoluntary Annexation
is continued with an exploration into the how the law and culture have
created a set of expectations around location that have emerged as a
social and political force driving a reordering of metropolitan space.
This Article will explore how municipal identity is formed and
reinforced through sociopolitical processes, legal rhetoric, and legal
reasoning. Part II of this Article will present a brief history of the role of
municipal boundaries in shaping the spatial, social, political, and
economic character of the modem metropolis. This Part presents the
history of jurisdiction, municipal incorporation, and boundary disputes as
both the result and expression of power relationships mapped onto
territory. Part III will tie municipal identity to the law and rhetoric of
property rights. This Part will unpack how municipal identity has been
filtered through property rights frames and the consequences of that for
metropolitan governance; it will also explore the links between property,
location, and identity formation.
Part IV will explore how over time courts have fueled concerns over
location risk and bolstered property-esque expectations in municipal
identity through legal rhetoric and legal reasoning. Specifically, this Part
examines the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Village of Belle Terre v.
Boraas24 and Milliken v. Bradley.25 This Part will explore how these
cases bolster notions of municipal identity as property through their
cavalier construction of alternate histories and alternate normative
conceptions of the meaning and consequences of municipal boundaries
and location construction. These cases and others lend additional
support to my contention that the social and jurisprudential framings of
location risk have reinforced the notion of municipal identity as property.
Part V will conclude by returning to the case of Detroit's
bankruptcy and hypothesizing on whether the history of the state's
municipal boundary policy and its impacts can be considered in a
municipal bankruptcy proceeding.
II.

BOUNDARIES AND MUNICIPAL INCORPORATION

The history of municipal boundary formation and reformation in the
twentieth century provides context for the essential role municipal
boundary law has played-and continues to play-in shaping the
sociology, politics, and economics of contemporary metropolitan life.
State laws typically afford many more powers to incorporated
24.
25.

Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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municipalities than to the unincorporated areas of a county.26 Unlike
county boundaries, which are set by the state for the purpose of carrying
out state administrative objectives, municipal boundaries are locally
driven.27 Municipal boundaries reflect much more than just the reality of
managing statewide territory in a manner that allows for the delivery of
certain state-mandated functions and policy directives. They reflect
organic processes of community formation, group identification, and
sociocultural expression occurring on the ground. They give a territorial
dimension to local politics, culture, and economics. They delimit the
range of a community's legal authority to regulate the social, economic,
and spatial character of its citizens' lives.
The evolution in the meaning and management of municipal
boundaries is evident in various contemporary controversies. Moreover,
the geography of urban poverty is shifting to the suburbs and once
declining inner cities are booming. Consequently, suburban residents are
threatened by the very real possibility of stagnating or declining home
values and demographic change from the entrance of racially mixed and
lower socioeconomic classes into what were once sanctuaries for white,
Ultimately our conception of the role of
middle-class America.28
municipal boundaries in a time of perceived rising location risk requires
wrestling with a normative vision of the future city, its biology, and why
municipal boundaries exist in the first place.
A BriefHistory of the Role of Boundary Formationin Shaping the
Modern Metropolis

A.

Most explorations of cities, urban life, the development of the
suburbs, and sprawl focus on the forces pushing human settlements

26.

See

DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL.,

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A

FEDERAL SYSTEM 20-21 (7th ed. 2010).

27. See Wegner, supra note 12, at 178. According to Wegner:
[T]he designation county is applied to units of government with widely varying
degrees of scope and function from the New England region in which the
county was subordinate to the town and confined to primarily judicial and
recordkeeping tasks to the Southern region in which the county is often the
most important unit of general purpose government, especially in rural areas
.... Because of the proliferation of special legislation, powers exercisable at a
county's option, and minutely differentiated categories of classification
according to population, the titles of county officers, the duties performed by
county government, and the structure of county government have presented a
bewildering kaleidoscope of form and function, even in one state jurisdiction.
Id. at 179 (omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting John
Martinez, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 2:13, at 55 (2012)).
28. See generally LEIGH GALLAGHER, THE END OF THE SUBURBS: WHERE THE
AMERICAN DREAM iS MOVING (2013).
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further and further away from some defined center.29 The coincident
impacts of density and scale on the built environment have long operated
to produce a sprawl that remakes the rural into the suburban and then
into the urban in an ongoing process that both drives and is driven by the
social, political, economic, and cultural milieu of American life. The
metropolis necessarily has a center and an edge.
Consequently,
boundaries matter. Their development and evolution are part of a
seldom-told story of cities.
Territorial jurisdiction categorizes land, gives precise definition to
the beginning and end of governmental authority, and casts territorial
community in concrete and homogeneous terms.30 But territorial
jurisdiction must be examined beyond its spatial aspects; scholar Richard
T. Ford has called jurisdiction "a discourse, a way of speaking and
understanding the social world.",31 It constructs legal status with regard
to the reach of law enforcement, the extension of the right to vote in a
municipality's elections, and who is subject to the levying of the
municipality's property taxes.32 Richard Briffault has elaborated further
on the essential role of municipal boundaries in shaping the character of
metropolitan governance. He cites the role of boundaries in demarcating
the multiple governmental entities providing local services in the
metropolis, facilitating the internalization of the costs and benefits of
local decision-making, and making taxpayer exit possible by providing
an outer33 limit to the revenue-raising and regulatory reach of the
locality.
While many regard boundaries as inevitable and pre-historical,
history shows otherwise. The invention of public space and public
property required the rhetoric and techniques of both cartographic
expression and extensive formal and informal regulation. The early
American colonies and towns were jurisdictionally defined either by
broad, abstract directional markers or by reference to a concentration of a
particular
identity group-religious,
ethnic,
or otherwise.34
Entrepreneurial colonial citizens created bounded town governments "to
29. For a definition and discussion of sprawl, see Wayne Batchis, Suburbanization
and Constitutional Interpretation: Exclusionary Zoning and the Supreme Court Legacy of
Enabling Sprawl, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 6-11 (discussing the history of sprawl
through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when the first suburban communities
began to form on the edges of cities like Boston and New York). See also Henry R.
Richmond, Sprawl and Its Enemies: Why the Enemies are Losing, 34 CONN. L. REv. 539,
539-40 (2002) (discussing the deconcentration of land and the industrialization and
urbanization of America).
30. See Ford, supra note 3, at 852-54.
31. See id. at 855.
32. See id. at 858.
33. See Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra note 3, at 1125-26.
34. See Ford, supra note 3, at 893-95.
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improve land, create spaces for commercial development, and control the
entrance of unwanted others[.],

35

During the nineteenth century, as the

connective infrastructure of the young nation was in the embryonic
stages of development, cities and towns were separately incorporated for
the purpose of providing scale-appropriate mechanisms for regulating
new public properties and facilitating the development of a national
economy.36 Local leaders established the terms for inclusion in the local
community, many of which hinged on durational residency
requirements. 37
Real estate developers also desired incorporated
municipalities, which increased land values and spurred land
speculation.38
Exclusionary motivations for creating new cities were present from
the early colonial settlements into the nineteenth century. As these
communities grew, however, the requirements of local membership
became unworkable. 39 The colonial government of Massachusetts was
the first to pass a "Town Act," establishing what is regarded as the first
municipal corporation. 4 0 By the time the Articles of Confederation were
established in 1672, local control over residency had given way to a
more modem "right to travel" that forced a transition to a concept of
jurisdiction based in the abstract, convenient, and apolitical need to
provide a generic set of services to a mobile population.4 1
By the late nineteenth century, states had extended municipalities'
taxation powers to pay for services, infrastructure, public safety, and
education.42 A burgeoning progressive movement advocated for more
35.

36.

NANCY BURNS, THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 46 (1994).
See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN

NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 117-18 (1996) (discussing how the incorporation of

cities and towns was a necessary component of the development of a legal tradition of
police regulation in public properties). Novak illustrates the common law lineage of
public rights in property and their influence on nineteenth-century municipal governance
and city life. See id. at 115-48. To say that public space is "invented" is underscored by
the state's ability to create legal and policy justifications for the redistribution of private
space, property, and power to the public for the purposes of developing national
infrastructure. See id.
37. See Ford, supra note 3, at 895.
38. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 35, at 32-34 (discussing the role of real estate
developers in pushing for the incorporation of new cities as western territories were
opened for settlement in the early nineteenth century).
39. See id. at 46-47.
40. See Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case
Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 369, 412-13 (1985) (discussing the historical
roots of municipal incorporation in colonial New England and the early construction of
municipal power).
41. See Ford, supra note 3, at 895.
42. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 35, at 47-48 ("These new services changed the
structure and consequences of institutional collective actions dramatically. They
increased developers' interest in some forms of local government. They increased
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technocratic
management
capabilities
for
cities
and
the
professionalization of city management as a counter to rising
immigration, cronyism, city bosses, and rampant corruption.43 The
progressive movement was less influential in the Southern states,
however, where the post-Civil War economic and social realignments
fueled a preference for centralized state power over municipal
governance as a method of ensuring white political power. 44 Further
complicating the reach of the progressive movement in the South was the
reality that wealthy landowners and commercial leaders, as opposed to
the ethnic political bosses of the North, controlled Southern cities.45
Regional differences aside, the late nineteenth century saw the
development of laws spelling out the procedures by which citizens could
create their own municipalities, lowering the cost of forming new
governments.4 6
There emerged during this period a vibrant academic debate about
the legal status of cities in relation to the states. Two dominant
viewpoints arose: Dillon's Rule and the Cooley Doctrine. Former Iowa
Supreme Court Justice John Dillon argued that local governments were
creatures of the states and therefore were entirely subject to state
authority.4 7 Conversely, former Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice
Thomas Cooley argued that, while the state may mold local institutions,
local government was a matter of absolute right that the state could not
take away.48 This ideological divide over the nature of state and local
power was settled in the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hunter v. City
4 9 which effectively constitutionalized state plenary power
of Pittsburgh,
over local subdivisions. It established that local governments were
subordinate to their states and that there was no right to local selfgovernment. 50 The Court settled the notion that there is not any federally
protected right to local self-government and solidified the status of cities
as mere creatures of state law.
The 1907 Hunter decision came at the dawn of a century that would
see the emergence of the modem metropolis and all of its technological,
citizens' interest in creating new local governments. And they set the stage for
heightened concerns about local taxes.").
43. See, e.g., STEVEN J. DINER, A VERY DIFFERENT AGE: AMERICANS OF THE
PROGRESSIVE ERA 20-24 (1998).

44. See BURNS, supra note 35, at 50-52.
45. See id.
46. See id.at 52.
47. See JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 138-40 (2d ed.
1873).
48. People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 108 (1871) (Cooley, J.,
concurring).
49. Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
50. See id. at 177-78.

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:3

sociological, and economic innovation. Industrialization, growing social
diversification, and the increasing complexity of the metropolitan
economy produced a backlash to constitutional city powerlessness that
manifested itself most forcefully in the home rule movement. 5' Home
rule statutes and constitutional amendments in the states devolved block
grants of power to local governments in a manner that freed them from
having to seek state legislative approval for the myriad of initiatives and
policy prerogatives that were uniquely local.5 2 Home rule had begun in
the late nineteenth century, but calls for greater local autonomy increased
in the early decades of the twentieth century.53 The home rule movement
forced a reconsideration of the institutional role of cities in the American
federal system. As states devolved power to local governments through
home rule, the courts affirmed the principle that a local government's
authority was derived from its ability to use its police 54
power to safeguard
the health, safety, and morals of the local community.
Central to the notion of home rule and local power is the question of
who sets the boundaries of the local community and the conditions under
which those boundaries are allowed to change. As social, spatial,
political, and economic developments spurred dramatic and constant
change in American cities throughout the twentieth century, local interest
groups began to demand unfettered authority to incorporate new
municipalities as a way to not only express the self-determination of their
respective communities, but also to escape those facets of city life they55
found undesirable, threatening, and unworthy of their support.
Liberalizing boundary formation and reformation policy coincided with
home rule movements to counter the relative powerlessness of cities
under Hunter.56 Landowners on the outskirts of cities desired control
over the extent to which they were taxed and the purposes for which they
were taxed. Municipal incorporation laws were essential to facilitating

51. See MANDELKER ETAL.,supra note 26, at 133; see also Gerald E. Frug, The City
as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1059, 1062-67 (1980) (discussing city
powerlessness).
52. See Frug, supra note 51, at 1116-17.
53. Seeid. atl115-16.
54. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 26, at 133-76.
55. See Tyson, supra note 9, at 336-38 (discussing the devolution of boundary
policy to local governments and the concurrent sociopolitical context for related shifts in
the boundary policy of many states).
56. See, e.g., Tyson, supra note 22, at 535-36 (discussing the notion of city
powerlessness and the theory that, due to their constitutional status as instrumentalities of
the states, cities are incapable of fully controlling their economic destinies and managing
the challenges produced by their dependency on attracting mobile capital).
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their self-determination amidst an expanding, diversifying, and
modernizing metropolis.57
The result of liberalizing municipal incorporation laws was an
explosion in the number, size, and character of suburban municipalities
in the twentieth century. At the turn of the century there were a handful
of suburban municipalities surrounding cities like Chicago, Los Angeles,
and Detroit. By the end of the twentieth century, that number had
increased over 100 percent in some cases, reflecting the extent to which
suburban landowners incorporated territory on the fringes of major
cities.58

Calls for greater local autonomy, specifically concerning
boundaries, are in many ways logical and predictable responses to the
challenges of managing service delivery within a rapidly expanding
metropolis.
But there are other motivations that reflect an
institutionalized resistance to the race and class dynamics that have
defined American society since its inception. For instance, concerns
about the location of the poor influenced the early incorporation of towns
in colonial New England. The founding documents of Watertown,
Massachusetts, in the late 1630s expressed "'[the] hope[] that there
would be no poor, and [that] Watertown had made special provisions to
exclude them.' ' 59 The town's creators wanted to ensure that higher taxes
would not result from the town's obligation to support poor residents.60
In 1887, white businessmen in Atlanta made an effort to create a separate
city for African Americans along Atlanta's southern border with the plan
of relocating the city's black population to the new municipality.6 '
Countless other examples of race and class motivations for creating
new municipalities clarify the exclusionary functions municipal
boundaries served and the early conceptions of location risk tied to a
community's relative demographic composition as well as proximity to
marginalized and subordinated groups.62 Race and class motivations
continued throughout the twentieth century and were a primary driver of
suburban municipal incorporations as the dismantling of facially

57. See Richmond, supra note 29, at 555 (discussing how weak boundary laws from
the nineteenth century made incorporation easy in the settlement of the West and caused
an explosion of tiny new cities around the nation's old central cities).
58. See id. at 555 tbl.3.
59. BuRNs, supra note 35, at 35 (quoting SUMNER CHILTON POWELL, PURITAN
VILLAGE: THE FORMATION OF ANEW ENGLAND TOWN 92 (1963)).
60. See id. at 36.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 35-37; see also Briffault, Local Government Boundary Problem, supra
note 3, at 1141-43.
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discriminatory policies in public accommodations, housing, and
schooling spurred a retreat from central cities to the suburbs.63
The construction of boundaries-municipal and otherwise-were a
central feature in the marginalization of African Americans and other
disfavored minority groups out of the mainstream of American economic
life at a time of considerable economic expansion and governmentsubsidized individual and family wealth creation. The Home Owners
Loan Corporation, which provided low-interest, long-term mortgage
loans to financially struggling families, employed a neighborhood rating
system which deliberately redlined predominately black neighborhoods
and denied loans to families living in those areas. 64 These residential
security maps literally drew new boundaries around black neighborhoods
and were regularly used by private banks to guide their lending practices.
The Federal Housing Administration ("FHA") and the Veterans
Administration ("VA") embraced these
practices when they were
65
founded in 1934 and 1944, respectively.
It is impossible to overstate the extent to which racial segregation
and, consequently, the removal of African Americans from the
mainstream of the massive federal underwriting of home ownership were
integrated into every facet of housing policy.
Accordingly,
contemporary notions of metropolitan area location risk can be traced
directly to the racialized design and administration of housing finance
policy. For years, the FHA's underwriting manual classified African
Americans as "adverse influences" on property values and warned
against the "infiltration of inharmonious racial or nationality groups" in
otherwise racially homogenous all-white neighborhoods. The FHA
warned land developers and realtors that "'[i]f a neighborhood is to
retain stability it is necessary that properties66 shall continue to be
occupied by the same social and racial classes.'

63.

See

KENNETH T. JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE

UNITED STATES, 195-203 (1985).

64. Id.; see also Ezra Rosser, The Ambition and Transformative Potential of
ProgressiveProperty, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 107, 136-37 (2013).
65. See id.
at 203-04.
66. Kevin Fox Gotham & James D. Wright, Housing Policy, in THE HANDBOOK OF
SOCIAL POLICY 401, 406 (James Midgley & Michelle Livermore eds., 2d ed. 2009)
(alteration in original) (quoting FED. Hous. ADMIN., UNDERWRITING MANUAL 233
(1936)); see also Paul Boudreaux, Homes, Rights, and Private Communities, 20 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 479, 487 (2009) (quoting EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER
ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 64-65 (1994)). The

extent to which federal policy spurred suburban development and the decline of central
cities cannot be overstated. Federal spending to aid urban development was a relatively
small $30 million during the New Deal era of the early 1930s. Robert Waste, Urban

Development Policy, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra, at 524, 525. By the
1960s annual spending averaged about 8% of all federal spending and rose to "a historic
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The real estate industry encouraged the use of racial covenants to
secure white exclusivity in neighborhoods. Neighborhood improvement
associations and businesses saw the covenants as a necessary tool to
safeguard white supremacy through social distance and through the
systematic removal of African Americans from the housing market-the
largest wealth-creating vehicle for ordinary Americans.67 The manner in
which ownership in real property and the social stigma of black
neighborhoods reinforce the racialized allocation of locational equity is
ultimately transferred intergenerationally and its impact is cumulative.
The research on housing discrimination by race illustrates well the
intersections between location and social identity.
The National
Association of Real Estate Boards published Fundamentals of Real
Estate Practicein 1943, wherein it explained:
The prospective buyer might be a bootlegger who would cause
considerable annoyance to his neighbors, a madam who had a
number of Call Girls on her string, a gangster who wants a screen for
his activities by living in a better neighborhood, a colored man of
means who was giving his children a college education and thought
high of 16% of all national government spending by 1980." Id. That level fell to 11%
during the Reagan and Bush years, rising again to 14% in the Clinton years. Id. The
1934 National Housing Act (the "Act") "created a Federal Housing Administration
(FHA) to create government-insured home mortgages to prop up the failing home
building industry[.]" Id. at 526. The Act also created the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation to insure the savings of individual depositors in the aftermath of
the banking failures of the Great Depression. Id. These early legislative acts began a
trend of directing federal assistance toward home building, banking, and only indirectly
to central cities. See id."The Federal Housing Act of 1949 created the Urban Renewal
Agency and signaled the beginning of a decade of urban renewal in center cities." Id.
This effort became known as "Negro Removal," as it set in motion a response to poverty
and blight that added a spatial dimension to the state-sanctioned racial discrimination that
defined that era. Id. "From 1950 to 1960, urban renewal funds were spent to raze over
120,000 substandard center-city housing units, which, in turn, were replaced with fewer
than 30,000 new housing units." Id. The new units were mostly consolidated in lowincome housing complexes, which ultimately became the embodiment of the perceptions
of government's dysfunction and cultural or behavioral explanations for persistent
poverty that dominated the politics of the 1980s and 1990s. See id.The post-World War
II GI Bill of Rights and the VA Home Loan Program also spurred the development of
suburban housing, which also received a boost from the unprecedented era of freeway
construction promoted by the Highway Act of 1956. Id These federal policy devices
and the heavily institutionalized race and class discrimination of the time led to a boom in
suburban housing development that could legally only benefit the white working class.
See id. at 527. By the time the War on Poverty policies of the 1960s attempted to address
the isolated inner city black poor, the suburban identity had calcified in a manner that
made location and boundaries all the more consequential. Id.
67. See, e.g., RICHARD H. CHUSED, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS IN PROPERTY
492-94 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing Shelley v.Kraemer and the impact of racial covenants
in limiting the market for housing, removing African-American homebuyers from the
mainstream of housing market activity and, ultimately, eliminating African Americans'
potential to create wealth through home ownership).
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No matter what the

motive or character of the would-be purchaser, if the deal would
instigate a form of blight, then certainly
the well-meaning broker
68
must work against its consummation.

When the U.S. Supreme Court declared racially restrictive
covenants unconstitutional in its 1948 decision Shelley v. Kraemer,6 9
zoning law emerged as the a key tool in the exclusionary architecture of
local politics. Early proponents and skeptics of zoning saw it as a
plausible substitute for deed restrictions. They recognized the potential
for racial exclusion through the implementation of architectural, spatial,
and aesthetic restrictions that limited entry for certain classes of
citizens. 70 There is an extensive body of research documenting the
extent to which exclusionary zoning and other policies intentionally and
systematically

divested

African

Americans

and other

disfavored

minorities from full participation in the government-sponsored and
subsidized
housing market throughout the entirety of the twentieth
71
century.

The confluence of these forces substantially redefined the meaning
and experience of American life in a manner that transformed
metropolitan regions by promoting, provoking, and facilitating an initial
wave of white flight and a subsequent wave of multiracial, middle-class
flight that has decimated the tax base and urban core of metropolitan
region central cities.72 This flight is quantifiable: in 1950, almost 70
percent of the population of 168 metropolitan regions lived in 193 central
cities; by 2000, over 60 percent of the population of 331 metropolitan
regions lived in suburbs. Over the same period, population densities in
the largest urbanized areas were effectively cut in half.73 But flight is not
68.

See BURNS, supra note 35, at 55 (omission in original) (quoting HERMAN H.

LONG & CHARLES S. JOHNSON, PEOPLE VS. PROPERTY: RACE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN

HOuSING 58 (1947)).
69. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).

70. See BURNS, supra note 35, at 56-57.
71. See, e.g., Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation,
Concentrated Affluence and the Obligationsof the Police Power, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1,
17-21 (2006) (discussing the public policies supporting private racism in the
development, marketing, and sale of residential real estate and the impact on the
psychology of the broader real estate market).
72. See, e.g., STEPHEN GRANT MEYER, AS LONG AS THEY DON'T MOVE NEXT DOOR:
SEGREGATION AND RACIAL CONFLICT IN AMERICAN NEIGHBORHOODS 218 (2000)
(providing opinion poll research from 1978 and 1996 showing white resistance to
residential integration and support for laws explicitly enforcing racial segregation).
73. For a discussion of the causes and consequences of white suburban flight, see
George C. Galster, White Flightfrom Racially IntegratedNeighborhoods in the 1970s:
The Cleveland Experience, 27 URn. STUD. 385, 391 (1990) (presenting econometric
research indicating that segregationist sentiment was a primary driver in white emigration
from racially integrated neighborhoods); Christopher J. Tyson, At the Intersection of
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the only manifestation of the manner in which race and class animus has
been mapped on to territory; patterns of racial discrimination have also
led to racial minorities being drawn out of cities and left in
unincorporated areas where county governments typically provide an
inferior level of services.74 Much of the history and character of
municipal organization can be explained by these discriminatory
motives.
These racial and class exclusionary effects are not just descriptive
facets of municipal boundary law's impact-they are essential
characteristics to the work municipal boundaries perform and their
resilience as the logic driving the organization and methodology of
metropolitan politics. Municipal boundary law facilitates exit and
consequently has worked to reproduce race and class-based disparities in
These particular
a manner that grows cumulatively over time.
dimensions of municipal boundaries have added stigma to residence and
place, signaling to the market areas for both investment and isolation.75
Annexation and municipal incorporation law are central to these
processes and have7 6in effect given a geographic character to race and
class-based politics.
B.

MunicipalIncorporationToday

States establish general standards for municipal incorporation.
These standards include requirements for minimum population,
minimum density, or the devotion of a significant portion of land within
Race and History: The Unique Relationship Between the Davis Intent Requirement and
the Crack Laws, 50 How. L.J. 345, 366 n.76 (2007) (citing Kyle Crowder, The Racial
Context of White Mobility: An Individual-Level Assessment of the White Flight
Hypothesis, 29 Soc. ScI. RESOURCES 223, 223 (2000)) ("[P]resenting research that

indicates that the likelihood of Whites leaving a neighborhood increases significantly
with the size of the minority population in the neighborhood and that Whites are
especially likely to leave neighborhoods containing combinations of multiple minority
groups[.]").
74. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Cities Inside Out: Race, Poverty, and Exclusion
at the Urban Fringe,55 UCLA L. REv. 1095, 1101-02 (2008).
75. See, e.g., Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of
Organization and the Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOzo L. REv.

1193, 1208-09 (2008) (discussing the exclusionary ethos of constitutionalizing zoning
laws and the manner in which municipalities gained power chiefly for the purpose of
shaping their demographic make-up through exclusionary practices).
76. Additionally, past motives for annexation have often intentionally served to
reproduce existing race and class inequality, resulting in metropolitan regions carved into
racially and socioeconomically defined local government units. Scholars have addressed
the processes of municipal under-bounding, i.e., annexation practices in which cities
grow around or away from low-income minority communities in an effort to exclude
them from municipal services and curtail their voting rights. See generally, e.g.,
Anderson, supra note 74.
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the proposed municipality to residential, commercial, industrial, or
related uses. 7 Some states also address whether an area has a need for a
new government or the resources to support it. This involves a
substantive inquiry into the operational costs of providing a base level of
infrastructure and services.78
The rules and threshold requirements that states attach to municipal
incorporation are designed to have an inhibiting effect on incorporation
activity, to ensure that new municipalities are able to provide the
requisite public services and infrastructure, and to guarantee that they
have the capacity for self-government. While incorporation standards in
some states can place a high burden on those endeavoring to create a new
city, in most states it is relatively easy to incorporate, and while several
legal prerequisites may need to be satisfied, incorporation is generally
available.7 9
A majority of states allow for relatively easy incorporation of new
municipalities and prevent central cities from unilaterally annexing new
territory without the consent of the residents within the territory proposed
for annexation.8 ° Consequently, in most states, individual property
owners control municipal boundary formation and reformation. The
municipal incorporation law of the majority of states reflects and
reinforces the long-standing associations between individual property
rights, self-determination, and local government autonomy. 81
Many unincorporated areas become annexation targets before they
are capable of incorporating as separate municipalities. The story of
Kingwood, Texas, shared earlier is one of the more dramatic tales of
boundary strife, but it is certainly not the only one. Clashes over
municipal incorporation and annexation continue today and are at the
center of local political battles in several states.82 For instance, several
failed attempts to create a break-away school district in a portion of
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, have fueled calls for the incorporation of an
entirely new city within the city's home parish, East Baton Rouge
Parish.8 3 Louisiana law provides that residents of any unincorporated
77.

See

RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE

AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 197-98 (7th ed. 2009).

78. See id.
79. See Platon N. Rigo & Charles J. Spindler, Municipal Incorporation and State
Statutes: A State-LevelAnalysis, 23 ST. & Loc. GOv'T REv. 76, 77 (1991).
80. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 26, at 81-87.
81. See id.
82. See, e.g., Tyson, supra note 9, at 303-25.
83. See Rebekah Allen, New City Sought for School District, ADvoc. (June 24,
2013), http://bit.ly/lc7Gcl6; Margaret Newkirk, Baton Rouge's Rich Want New Town to
Keep Poor Pupils Out: Taxes, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2014, 12:00 AM),
http://bloom.bg/LTIBaO; Rob Quinn, Latest Secession Seeker: Baton Rouge's Richer
Side, USA TODAY (Dec. 2, 2013, 10:56 AM), http://usat.ly/lhUEOL.
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area with a population in excess of 200 inhabitants may propose the
incorporation by first delivering a petition for annexation signed by 25
percent of the electors residing in the area.84 State law then provides that
the Governor reviews the petition for compliance and, if approved, the
matter proceeds to a vote of the electors residing in the area proposed for
incorporation.85
Calls for a new city called St. George, Louisiana, followed the 2005
creation of the City of Central, also in East Baton Rouge Parish.8 6 That
city was created in large measure as a response to calls for a separate
school district. The relatively new city of Central, Louisiana, offers
minimal services due to its ability to either contract with the larger cityparish system in East Baton Rouge Parish or its close proximity to all of
the amenities located in the center city. Central leaders promised no new
taxes in their campaign to incorporate a new city and are frank about
why they are able to keep taxes low to this day. According to the head of
the incorporation effort, "When you start to add extra services-if you
ever decide to build a performing arts center or something-that's when
you start to pay morel.]"8 7 Central's location near the center city but
relative distance from the challenges and redistributory obligations of the
central city's operations is essential to the character of government and
taxing structure it is able to offer its citizens.
St. George proponents are also motivated by school-district-related
issues. If created, St. George would be the fourth largest city in the state
of Louisiana and one of the wealthiest. By some estimates, it would
leave what was left of Baton Rouge with a $53 million budget shortfall.8 8
One way to undermine the breakaway effort is for Baton Rouge to invite
landowners in the unincorporated areas of the parish to petition to be
annexed into the city proper. Louisiana's annexation laws require the
consent of property owners; there is no unilateral annexation option for
the city. Property owners who voluntarily petition for annexation would
diminish the potential tax base of any proposed new city. 89 The politics
that these annexation and incorporation battles produce, however, are
reflective of perceived location risk and vested rights in municipal
identity. A supporter of the push for a new city cited that the effort
would allow those pushing for a new city to "'control [their] own
84. See LA, REv. STAT. ANN. § 33:1 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess.).
85. See id. § 33:3.
86. See Steven Ward, Central Blazed Trail for St. George Incorporation Effort,
ADvoc. (Mar. 6, 2014), http://bit.ly/ln3qfn2.
87. See Ward, supra note 86.
88. See Elizabeth Crisp, No ClearLeaderfor St. George Opposition, ADVOC. (Dec.
23, 2013), http://bit.ly/lb5ZVnp.
89. See Rebekah Allen, LSU Mulls Annexation into City of Baton Rouge, ADvoc.
(Feb. 26, 2014), http://bit.ly/lk99mWb.
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destiny." 90 Similar efforts are afoot throughout the nation, most of them
driven by a desire for independent or breakaway school districts. 9 1
All incorporation or annexation battles raise concerns about
demographics, taxation, and government spending.
A cursory
examination of recent municipal incorporation efforts reveals a common
set of ambitions, criticisms, and concerns. The incorporation of Semmes,
Alabama, in 2010 was driven in part by concerns about taxation after the
Semmes area came under the police jurisdiction of the city of Mobile and
was faced with a 2.5 percent sales tax and oversight by Mobile's
Planning Commission. 92
Estero, Florida, sought to defensively
incorporate itself to avoid a feared annexation by its neighbor, Bonita,
Florida. 93 Also in Florida, residents of North Central Miami-Dade
County pursued incorporation as a means of preventing the "cherrypick[ing]" of the unincorporated land in their area by other county
municipalities looking to expand their territory through annexation. 94 A
Miami-Dade County resident described the decision to incorporate the
area as "'remaining as you are or having your own selfdetermination." 95
The Miami-Dade incorporation of the area would create one of the
state's largest predominately African-American- and Latino-populated
cities, and the race and class undertones of the annexation effort are
visible in the statements of proponents of the incorporation effort. One
observer who expressed frustration over the lack of "'economic
diversity' initiatives introduced and implemented by the area's county
commissioners directly addressed a narrow land use agenda. "'All they
do is affordable housing,"' she remarked. 96 These examples and others
are evidence that municipal incorporation is still a live issue and is tied to
the growth of metropolitan regions. The simultaneous movement to
cities and desire for separate territorial autonomy underscores the need
for further exploration of municipal identity in the modem metropolis.

90. See Allen, supra note 83.
91. See Newkirk, supra note 83.
92. See David Ferrara, Semmes Voters Approve Incorporation Almost 3 to 1,
AL.COM (Aug. 18, 2010, 5:00 AM), http://bit.ly/IcC86Zv; Robert McClendon, Semmes
Incorporation Would Come at Mobile's Expense, AL.COM (Aug. 15, 2010, 7:45 AM),
http://bit.ly/LCcuKA.
93.

See Chris Umpierre, Estero Pushesfor City Status, NEWS-PRESS.COM (July 12,

2013), http://newspr.es/l g755x l.
94. See Jose Perez, Residents Push Plans for New City, S. FLA. TIMES (June 27,
2013), http://bit.ly/Mvv6g5.
95. See id.
96. See id.
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C. A Positive Theory of the Metropolis
Inequality and economic stratification are managed in metropolitan
areas. Metropolitan area governments are chiefly responsible for
addressing the imbalances and mal-distributions of a market economy
and the legacy of race, class, and gender-based economic
marginalization. The metropolis is fundamentally an exercise in the
redistribution of wealth, social power, and cultural capital. Scale,
proximity, density, and jurisdiction all support and shape these
redistributory functions.
Municipal fragmentation operates to limit the scope of wealth
redistribution within the broader metropolis. Municipal boundaries have
functioned to reinforce existing racial and class-based systems of
privilege and disadvantage; thus, notions of the benefit and value to be
derived from the formation of municipalities involve assessments about
the race and class identity of the residents within those boundaries and
the potential impact their presence within the municipal community
might have on real or perceived property values.
State boundary policy separates groups of people in the metropolis
who would otherwise receive public goods and services from the same
source. This separation leads to the uneven distribution of metropolitan
area benefits and burdens and renders the freedom and self-determination
gains produced by liberal boundary policies a very costly endeavor.97
There is a great deal of irrationality that goes into these decisions as well.
Narrative, imagination, and the perception of risk are all highly irrational
forces that have as much influence on metropolitan ordering as does the
need for connections and information.
The specter of incorporation battles and the growing intensity of the
provincialism they evidence reflect an ideology of hostile privatism that
undermines the potential of interconnected and interdependent
do
metropolitan communities. 98 Ti
This ideology
prioritizes the preservation
of property values above any other social goals. Property values are
correlated in large measure with the value of the human beings
occupying the property as opposed to any other basis. Preserving
property values implicitly involves the maintenance of existing patterns
of race and class stratification and geographic isolation. Municipal

97.

See Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO.
L. REv. 637, 647 (2012) (discussing how the Tiebout-style gains that flow from
the population sorting that occurs in highly fragmented metropolises is offset by the
efficiency losses for regional governance).
98. See EVAN MCKENZIE, PR1VATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF
RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 18-19 (1994) (coining the phrase "ideology of
hostile privatism").
MASON
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boundaries are a crucial feature of the legal architecture facilitating the
pursuit of such aims.
In her scholarship on municipal annexation law in North Carolina,
Judith Wegner has called for the examination of the process of
expanding municipal boundaries as part of the broader "ecology of local
governmental and quasi-governmental activities." 99 It is this notion of
the governance and administrative ecology of the modem metropolis that
is essential to the development of a coherent theory of the role of
boundaries in the modem metropolis.' 00 For American metropolitan
regions, the fundamentally redistributive ethos of urbanity is an essential
feature; its reality and the various public responses to it have existed
since the founding of the nation's early settlements.
Richard Briffault aptly deduced:
[T]he fundamental feature of contemporary metropolitan governance
is the operation of locally bounded fiscal and regulatory autonomy in
regions where economic and social activity transcends local
boundaries. Each local government has an economic incentive to
pursue its own local goal of attracting new tax base contributors
while excluding net service cost demanders. 101
The ecology of local government boundary law involves the range
of forces impacting how municipal boundaries are perceived in the
public's consciousness and how they respond socially and politically to
that perception. This ecology operates on at least two dimensions. In
one dimension there is the need for the efficient and reliable delivery of
basic and essential public services. The metropolis is designed to fulfill
many roles that are purely functional. Metropolitan areas cluster people
within a territorial expanse in a way that facilitates the delivery of public
goods and services. These not only include utilities and infrastructure
but also the experience of democracy and participatory government.
Scale significantly impacts the cost of service delivery, the ratio of
spatial proximity to democratic expression, and the ratio of spatial
proximity to community experience all factor into the equation of how
local government functions on behalf of its citizens. Service provision
and delivery is fundamentally a redistributive exercise since not
99. See Wegner, supra note 12, at 171.
100. For a discussion of various and competing theoretical visions of the city or the
metropolis, see, for example, Hoi Kong, Toward A FederalLegal Theory of the City, 57
McGILL L.J. 473, 475 (2012); Michael W. McConnell & Randal C. Picker, When Cities
Go Broke: A ConceptualIntroduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 425,
483-90 (1993); Thomas Poole, Proportionalityin Perspective, 2010 N.Z. L. REV. 369; A.
Dan Tarlock, City Versus Countryside: Environmental Equity in Context, 21 FORDHAM
URB.L.J. 461 (1994).
101. See Briffault, Local Government BoundaryProblem, supra note 3, at 1136.
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everyone contributes to the ecological system in the same manner or to
the same degree.
The other dimension relates to identity; it functions to solidify the
bonds of common interest, mutual benefit, and linked fate across the
dominant social and political connections of the day. The community
identity dimension of metropolitan life links territory to group identity,
culture, and history. This fosters an emotional, personal investment in
localism. The sense of linked fate within a community necessarily has a
limit-a discernable endpoint beyond which that sense of common
interest does not extend. The solidarity and oppositional identity forged
from that experience require that territory be exclusive and safeguarded
through a provincial and inward-looking consciousness.
Municipal incorporation and annexation law has evolved, in
significant measure, to suit the diminishing appetite for redistribution and
the specific race, class, and other identity prisms through which systems
of wealth and resource redistribution are politically and culturally
understood. Municipal incorporation law is too often deployed to bolster
principles of privatization, consumer choice, and a high-stakes, zero-sum
culture of location risk mitigation, which undermines the redistributive
ethos of metropolitan life. A positive theory of the metropolis must
involve the resurrection of a communitarian ethic that views this
redistributory ethos as a necessary social and cultural good. It must seek
to limit the extent to which boundaries facilitate exit from a social
contract forged on interdependence and linked fate across identity lines.
Finally, it must vigorously interrogate the antisocial theory at the core of
normative conceptions of property values and resist its continued
promotion.
III. LOCATION, PROPERTY, IDENTITY, AND THE METROPOLIS
The identity component of municipal identity refers simultaneously
to the legal identity of the territory and the identity of the people living
there. Over time municipal boundaries fuse with individual and group
identity, forging an existential investment in jurisdictional boundaries
that is often expressed and understood in profoundly personal and deeply
felt ways. Municipal identity fundamentally exposes the inseparable
nature of individual and group identity and territory where the modem
metropolis is concerned. Just as individuals create value in property by
using property law to determine their relationship with others vis-A-vis
the land, so too do individuals create value in a location by using local
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to determine their relationship with others vis-A-vis the
government 0 law
2
metropolis.1
The desire to exit the central city or incorporate a new one is
complicated and cannot be completely explained through an analysis of
the institutional decisions that are the focus of this Article. There are
conditions on the ground in every community that reflect specific, unique
dynamics impacting location choice, sometimes just as much as the
historical and institutional considerations presented herein. Not all
suburban dwellers exit the central city as a conscious move to avoid its
taxing power or out of race or class animus. Furthermore, there are
perfectly valid and legitimate reasons individuals and families seek the
outskirts of the city.
Less density, larger and more affordable homes, more open space,
shorter commutes to work (if work is located in the suburbs), and newer
construction and infrastructure are all relatively apolitical reasons for
moving out of a central metropolitan area. There is also the reality that
there are many suburban dwellers who became so not because they fled
the city, but because the city eventually encroached into their otherwise
rural, unincorporated domain and transformed its physical character into
that of a suburb.'0 3 Their ties to the territory where they reside-the
territory subsequently subsumed into a suburban municipal identitymay be entirely organic, pre-political, and a natural outgrowth of a social
and economic community that existed before state intervention. 0 4 Their
desire to live in close proximity to the city but not actually in the city can
simply be a lifestyle choice borne out of personal needs and desires.
In critiquing the excesses and deficiencies of suburban municipal
identity, it is important not to underestimate the moral weight of the
connections that groups of people have to territory independent of the
politics of metropolitan fragmentation or urban sprawl.105 Suburbanites

102. See, e.g., Stahl, supra note 75, at 1208-09 (discussing the exclusionary ethos of
constitutionalizing zoning laws and the manner in which municipalities gained power
chiefly for the purpose of shaping their demographic make-up through exclusionary
practices).
103. This is an important observation in any discussion about the central city and its
environs. The reality of sprawl is not just a story of suburban growth on the outskirts of
central cities, but also of the sprawling development of central cities that have expanded
to turn once rural areas into suburban ones. This has been explored in nuisance law in
cases such as Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), and Spur
Industries,Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co., 494 P.2d 700 (Ariz. 1972).
104. See Ford, supra note 3, at 859-60 (discussing organic jurisdiction as one of the
descriptions ofjurisdiction that operates in legal and political discourse).
105. See id. Ford's discussion of organic jurisdiction presents both national and
subnational examples of the organic relationship between groups and the territory they
occupy. See id. at 845. Ford's presentation of the jurisdiction discourse is relevant for a
full understanding of the complexities of assessing suburban municipal identity.
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not only cherish the sovereignty available through a separately bounded
territorial community-their vision of self-determination, personal
wealth creation, and physical and psychological security depends on it.
The self-determination and sovereignty associated with local government
are understood as the natural order in the same way that commonly held
notions of property are.
Not everyone in the suburbs is at odds with the central city. But the
aforementioned possibilities for suburban motive do not reflect the
Generally speaking,
mainstream of the suburban identity.
suburbanization and the suburban identity are organized around the
notion of exit-the decision to leave the formal boundaries of the city for
the purpose of relocating on its outskirts. In too many cases, individuals
and families end up in suburban jurisdictions as a result of very
deliberate, calculated decisions. There, residents can access the benefits
of the city without having to pay for those benefits or the associated
burdens of city life. Most suburban residents chose to exit their
metropolitan area central city in name only-their communities are part
of the metropolitan identity and experience that is anchored by the
central city.
The growing focus on jurisdiction and boundaries represents an
evolution in the contemporary suburban identity. Municipal identity's
emergence at the center of a high-stakes game of location risk mitigation
begs an examination of the underlying forces of identity, location, and
the property-esque right to a separate municipal identity that have
captured the contemporary suburban imagination. Municipal identity
relies on the mythology of property to validate the pursuit of individual
freedom, group identity, and prosperity in exclusive ways. It is the result
of the manner in which identity, property, and location are constructed
through experiences and linkages both imagined and real. Furthermore,
the notion of municipal identity as property distorts the civic republican
ideal of the role of property ownership as providing the necessary
foundation for civic virtue and the pursuit of the common good. 116 It
106. See Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal
Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 273, 286 (1991). During the early years of the nation, many
believed that property provided not just a stake in the action but also a sense of
responsibility, a concern about the stability of government, and a lack of dependence on
others that were essential for an intelligent voting population. Land ownership was tied
to civic identity-the right to vote and hold elected office were tied to property
ownership, which is the essence of civic republicanism. Civic republicans believed that
property ownership provided the necessary foundation for virtue, enabling citizens to
pursue the common welfare. Parts of this theory began to break down in the early years
of the nineteenth century, particularly those parts dealing with the political rights of nonlandholding men. See, e.g., CHUSED, supra note 67, at 17-19. Municipal identity as
property occurs as a distortion of the civic republican ideal of the role of property
ownership.
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devalues the notion of the common good by over-focusing on who
constitutes the common than with what actions constitute the good.
Interestingly enough, municipal identity as property incorporates
both the communitarian ironies at the center of localism and the manner
in which notions of the individual and collective self are expressed
through the social and legal construction of ownership over place and
territory. Ultimately, the notion of municipal identity as property confers
upon a community the legal legitimation of expectations of power and
enshrined in state law without regard for the
control that have been
107
impact of that power.
A.

Identity and Location

Location is everything. The value of one's home, the social value
attached to one's networks, and the political value assigned to one's
neighborhood are all impacted by one's location in the metropolis. Many
Americans regard the decision of where to purchase or rent a home to be
highly consequential and linked with other decisions that ultimately
impact quality of life, wealth creation, social status, political power, and
Location decisions incorporate
perceived safety and well-being.
presumptions about wealth, privilege, poverty, disadvantage, status, and
stigma. They facilitate both wildly esoteric and painfully tangible
distinctions between communities that translate into market value,
political power, and social worthiness. Social and consumer behavior
within metropolitan regions responds to these dynamics. Moving to one
regional locality versus another is not just about choosing between local
governments or taxing structures; it is about choosing an identity.
When contemplating the roots of the social investment in municipal
identity and its relationship to both the individual and community, it is
also necessary to explore the role of imagination. Imagination has been
broadly defined as the "capacity to conceive of objects or experiences
not presently available to the senses" and implicates a range of mental
activities.'0 8 In Imagination and Choice,10 9 Anne Dailey argued that
adult reasoned decisionmaking in American law implicates the
foundational skill of imagination. 10 This perspective is instructive for
understanding not only the development of municipal identity in

107. See generally Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1709
(1993) (discussing the role whiteness as property plays in legitimizing expectations of
racial power and control).
108. Anne C. Dailey, Imagination and Choice, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 175, 177
(2010).
109. Anne C. Dailey, Imaginationand Choice, 35 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 175 (2010).
110. Seeidatl78.
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suburbia, but also the personal investment in municipal identity and its
relationship to real and perceived risk.
Boundaries are legal constructs with deep, sociopolitical meanings.
Unless the line between city and suburb is marked by a natural feature
like a river or a change in the terrain, few metropolitan residents know
the exact boundaries separating one metropolitan area municipality from
the other. The actual location of the boundary matters little. It does not
affect the day-to-day experience of living in a metropolitan area.
Therefore, imagination plays a role in constructing the social and legal
meaning of municipal boundaries. Metropolitan residents imagine that
their municipal identity-arbitrarily propped up through invisible
boundaries-is the arbiter of status and opportunity. Consequently,
municipal boundary law, like zoning, functions as a method of social
control in the metropolis. 11'
How place is imagined is impacted by how connections to it
actually form. Scholars have examined the links between individual
identity formation and place.1 12 Physical settings, human activities,
architectural and development patterns, and social history all impact how
one location is viewed in relation to another and ultimately in relation to
the individual. 113 At a very fundamental level people have a need to
their physical environment-what scholars call
attach themselves to
"place attachment."' 1 4 One of the dimensions of place attachment
focuses on the manner in which people use their identification with a
place in order to distinguish themselves from others.1 15 If this
identification is reinforced by the social position and historic patterns of
resource allocation, it can strengthen or diminish individual and group
self-esteem. In either case, the investment in place is intense; it validates
one's relative privilege or can be offered to explain one's relative
disadvantage.
Place attachment is connected to a host of real and perceived risks
to individual and family security and prosperity. It implicates issues of
goal support and temporal and personal continuity.' 16 And in the current
111. Scholars have long dissected the role of zoning in regulating development and
social relations in cities. While I do not disagree, I would argue that boundaries are an
underappreciated force in the broader consideration of local governance. For a
discussion of how zoning is a tool for social control, see generally, for example, J.
Gregory Richards, Zoning for Direct Social Control, 1982 DUKE L.J. 761.
112. See Janne Lindstedt, Place,Identity and the Socially Responsible Construction of
Place Brands, 7 PLACE BRANDING & PUB. DIPL. 42, 44-45 (2011) (citing E. RELPH,
PLACE AND PLACELESSNESS (1976)).
113. See id. at 44.
114. See id at 45 (citing Leila Scannell & Robert Gifford, Defining Place
Attachment: A TripartiteOrganizingFramework,30 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 1 (2010)).
115. Seeid.at47.
116. See Scannell & Gifford, supra note 114, at 5.
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commercialized, consumerist moment, it directly impacts wealth creation
and maintenance. The factors impacting place attachment are also in
sync with the ways in which attachments to real property are developed
and socially reinforced. Consequently, as people are developing deeply
psychic connections and investments in their respective locations, they
are also forming property-esque expectations that, while not always
constitutionally based, have social, political, and economic meaning.
Individuals have a need to attach themselves to their environments
and therefore need to be able to link certain kinds of meanings to their
environments." 7 Accordingly, place attachment is connected to place
branding. The former focuses on the individual's attachment to place.
The latter focuses on the group's promotion of place. Of the several
definitions of place branding, the one emphasizing a social approach
defines it as "'the means both for achieving competitive advantage in
order to increase inward investment and tourism, and also for achieving
community development, reinforcing local identity, and identify[ing]...
the citizens with their city and activating all social forces to avoid social
exclusion and unrest." '1 8 The rise in cityhood and anti-annexation
movements suggest that any commitment to the social approach is being
overshadowed by the desire for competitive advantage in an intermetropolitan quest for property value maximization. Place branding is
usually a tool deployed in a zero-sum game for economic development
positioning and provincial, inward-focused wealth creation." 9
The scholarly discourse on place attachment cites globalization,
increased mobility, and environmental problems as destabilizing forces
for the places to which people become attached. 20 Metropolitan
fragmentation is another threat that destabilizes the sense of community
that ties the metropolis together. The desire to carve out exclusive,
separate locations within the modem metropolis underscores the extent
to which metropolitan location has been commodified and propertized.
In an increasingly consumer-oriented society, the private residence and
the community within which it is located are in many ways viewed as
just another commodity-property worthy of the utmost protection. As
these consumer-focused principles increasingly influence common
perceptions of community, belonging, and the self, where one resides

117. See, e.g., Lindstedt, supra note 112, at 45 (citing Scannell & Gifford, supra note
114).
118. Id.at 44 (quoting Michalis Kavaratzis, From City Marketing to City Branding:
Towards a Theoretical Frameworkfor Developing City Brands, 1 PLACE BRANDING &
PUB.DIPL. 58, 70 (2004)).
119. For a broader discussion of inter-municipal competition for economic
development and mobile capital, see generally Tyson, supra note 22.
120. See Scannell & Gifford, supra note 114, at 1.
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occupies a heightened position in the existential components of his or her
identity. As urban leaders increasingly adopt branding techniques once
the domain of commercial products and services to cities, so too does the
12 1
individual relate her location with her real and aspirational self-image.
B.

PropertyRights and MunicipalIdentity

Municipal identity is not a recognized species of property in any
traditional sense. Jurisdiction and the municipal entities that formalize
jurisdiction are creatures of state law, enabled by each state's land use
and municipal boundary management regime. While local sovereignty is
not recognized in our constitutionalism and accordingly does not
constitute any protected set of property rights,122 there has emerged a
species of property rights borne of human experience. Legal scholars
have theorized the manner in which several social constructs, identities,
and institutions have acquired the characteristics of property with regard
to their social meanings.123 "Municipal identity as property," therefore,
is a metaphor that characterizes the social and political meanings that
attach to municipal identity and the corresponding legal expectations it
fosters in individuals and communities.
"Municipal identity as property" is also intended to highlight the
ways in which municipal identity performs both the theoretical and
functional work that occurs in a property rights system. Theoretically,
municipal identity defines and reinforces social relations, clarifies
relationships between people in relation to territory, and facilitates
personal and group identity development. Functionally, municipal
121. See Bill Baker, Foreword to CITY BRANDING: THEORY AND CASES, at xiii, xiv
(Keith Dinnie ed., 2011).
122. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50 (discussing the Supreme Court's
decision in Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, which settled the notion that there is not any
federally protected right to local self-government). Hunter and the developments in local
government law that followed marked a considerable shift in the legal conception of both
the city and the suburb in American urban policy. See, e.g., Wayne Batchis, Enabling
Urban Sprawl: Revisiting the Supreme Court's Seminal Zoning Decision Euclid v.
Ambler in the 21st Century, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 373 (2010) (discussing Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and its impact on the development of
suburban sprawl and the historical nexus between suburban development and center city
decline); Stahl, supra note 75 (discussing the historical relationship between cities and
the socioeconomic and political factors fueling the development of the twentieth-century
suburb); Wegner, supra note 12, at 180-85 (discussing municipal incorporation and
providing a contemporary overview of the power dynamics between state legislatures and
municipal leaders).
123. See generally, e.g., Harris, supra note 107 (exploring the development of
whiteness as a property right and presenting a framework for how property rights are
socially constructed even if not formally recognized in law); Goutam U. Jois, Note,
Marital Status as Property: Toward a New Jurisprudencefor Gay Rights, 41 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 509 (2006).
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identity allows groups to essentially "own" territory and govern it in a
manner that not only allows them to exclude dissimilarly situated others,
but also confers upon them status and reputational benefits which
translate into market value.
The property rights implicated primarily operate in rhetoric-both
popular rhetoric and legal rhetoric. Their rhetorical foundations do not
diminish their material significance, however; widely held notions of
property rights, entitlements, and vested interests form the basis for
citizen-led movements to codify those notions in public policy and law.
The increase in citizen-led movements for separate jurisdiction is not
simply a function of the availability of easy, relatively low-cost
municipal incorporation or property-owner driven annexation regimes.
Municipal identity has emerged as a status and right that many feel
significantly impacts their lives and therefore warrants the utmost
government protection. These individuals and groups frequently deploy
property rights rhetoric to express what they view as a fundamental right.
Conceptualizing municipal identity, therefore, requires conceptualizing
how a separate jurisdiction becomes property in the minds of
metropolitan residents who increasingly band together to zealously
pursue it.
It is first necessary to explore the meaning of property rights and
how they relate to the governance of territory in the modem metropolis.
Historically, there are a number of theoretical frames for understanding
property rights, including first possessor rules, the creation of value,
Lockean labor theory, personality theory, utilitarian theory, and the
community or social view of property. 124 Classical views of property
rights emphasize the natural character of property and its relationship to
the individual freedom. Property rights encompass an array of rights and
privileges exercised by persons and enforced by the state. A property
rights regime necessarily draws boundaries and creates and enforces
structures of power. Furthermore, property law creates and manages
expectations of power over things and over people in relation to things.
It is concerned with the maintenance of order upon which individual and
group expectations can rely. Society as a whole benefits when
individuals possess reasonably secure entitlements in the things
necessary to generate wealth and prosperity. 25 These expectations

124.

See, e.g., Harris, supra note 107 at 1725-26 (reviewing the theoretical basis of

differing views of property).

See also generally ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE
PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND (2007) (presenting
the social view of property).
125. Id. at 19 (discussing the misconception of property rights as chiefly concerned
with individual rights rather than collective rights).
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constitute the basis for social stability, which is the lynchpin of
America's capitalist democracy.
The relationship between our existing system of property rights, the
public perception of what a property right is, and municipal identity is
best understood through the social view of property. The social theory of
property posits that the benefits derived from a property rights system are
noteworthy not for how they enable individual rights, but rather for how
they facilitate broader social goals such as the organization of rights in
the land. The focus on the rights of persons in relation to things often
obscures the fact that our property rights system is a legal mechanism
chiefly focused on regulating land use. Land use regulations reflect
social relationships and the desire to order the landscape according to
shared, socially oriented goals. The extent of the social welfare
foundations undergirding our property rights system is often
overshadowed by the individualist frame within which property rights
are popularly understood. 126 But scholars are increasingly injecting
socially driven analyses into the property rights discourse. 27 There is a
social obligation norm in property that runs through traditional doctrine
and operates to promote community and human flourishing.128 In
considering the property features of municipal identity-how municipal
identity works to reinforce property-esque notions of rights and risk
related to territory-it is important to begin with the social foundations
of property rights and the social ethos of life in the metropolis.
The social features of our property rights systems are the most
informative for understanding municipal identity as property. In The
Community Aspect of Private Ownership,129 Nadav Shoked examined the
community aspect of private property as a way of exploring the depths to
which private property rights and value in private property are socially
constructed and highly dependent on constantly shifting and evolving
social meanings.130 Shoked's exploration of the social or communitarian
aspects of private property largely centers on the ways in which
contemporary property rights regimes over-focus on individual rights and
under-appreciate the social aspects of proeprty. For instance, Shoked
contends that contemporary property rights protect the right of an
individual to stay in her home but do not protect her from the

126. See generally id.
127. See Rosser, supra note 64, at 110-11.
128. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-ObligationNorm in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745, 760-73 (2009) (discussing human flourishing and the
social obligations of ownership).
129. Nadav Shoked, The Community Aspect of Private Ownership, 38 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 759 (2011).
130. See generally id.
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neighborhood itself changing and, in doing so, fundamentally alter the
foundations upon which the value of her home is based.131 Shoked's
example illustrates how individual identity and social position impact
notions of value, community, and group identity. Ultimately, his
observations highlight the centrality of the communitarian or social view
in the ways in which property rights actually function.
It is evident in the politics of contemporary cityhood and antiannexation movements that the community aspects of property rights are
in play but notably distorted. These movements elevate notions of
collective property rights conceptualized as serving important social
goals:
self-determination, participatory democracy through scalesensitive jurisdiction (small government), and a sense of linked fate. But
those goals are fundamentally exclusive in nature-they are predicated
upon normative conceptions of who is a part of the community and who
is not. They are often pursued in antisocial ways and seek to limit the
definition of who constitutes community and, accordingly, who is worthy
of sharing in the redistribution of a community's resources. Municipal
identity, therefore, simultaneously affirms and undermines the
community aspect of private property. It highlights both the positive and
negative dimensions of the community interest in private property rights
and the creation of property values.
The idea of municipal identity extends the mythology of absolute
rights in property to local jurisdiction. 32 Through the collective action
facilitated through local government law, communities have the ability to
exercise control over territory just as individuals exercise control over
private property. 133 The manner in which municipal identity has evolved
to be understood as something akin to a property right exposes the
inherent contradictions between the traditionally liberal individualist
conception of property rights at the core of suburban localism and the
communitarian foundations also essential to the suburban identity.
Confronting this fundamental contradiction invites an opportunity to
explore the social obligations of property in a manner that destabilizes
the sense of entitlement and exclusivity that is rooted in traditional
notions of property rights and that has expanded into common
understandings about territory, jurisdiction, and community in the
modem metropolis.
131. See id. at 792-94 (discussing personhood and property rights).
132. See Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REv. 277, 281-82
(1998).
133. This contradiction between the grouping function of municipal identity and the
ability to be insulated from social obligations as facilitated by achieving separate
jurisdiction has been explored in the context of common interest communities. See, e.g.,
Rosser, supra note 64, at 159-61.
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IV. MUNICIPAL IDENTITY AS PROPERTY AND THE COURTS

Legal rhetoric and legal reasoning are essential components of the
property-rights expectations that municipal identity fosters. The manner
in which the courts have adjudicated land use cases and, most
importantly, the rhetoric and reasoning deployed in those decisions, have
reinforced the high stakes of location risk. There are no generally
accepted judicial principles for reviewing whether a particular local
government ought to exist, what the geographic dimensions ought to be,
or whether a particular territory ought to be in one local government or
the other. 134 These matters are rarely litigated, for the nature of local
government law-specifically, the systematic devolution of boundary
power to locals-has rendered many of these disputes either
predetermined by statute or reduced to minor squabbles over ministerial
actions. The question of whether a municipality should exist or whether
a central city can annex new territory1 35is typically spelled out clearly in
state law long before a dispute occurs.
As the modem American middle class developed around home
ownership, considerable wealth was created in private residences and the
communities where they were located. This wealth had to be protected
from the perceived threat of proximity to neighboring communities of
134. Briffault, Who Rules at Home?, supra note 3, at 395.
135. The supremacy of state law over local interests in relation to the formation and
reformation of municipal boundaries, while subject to certain limitations, remains a
defining tenant in local government law. The highest profile cases dealing specifically
with municipal boundaries are Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960), and Holt
Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978). In Gomillion, the Court held
unconstitutional an act of the Alabama legislature that altered the boundaries of the city
of Tuskegee, Alabama, in a manner that disenfranchised the majority of black voters
from the city's governance. The Court stated:
According to the allegations here made, the Alabama Legislature has not
merely redrawn the Tuskegee city limits with incidental inconvenience to the
petitioners; it is more accurate to say that it has deprived the petitioners of the
municipal franchise and consequent rights and to that end it has incidentally
changed the city's boundaries. While in form this is merely an act redefining
metes and bounds, if the allegations are established, the inescapable human
effect of this essay in geometry and geography is to despoil colored citizens,
and only colored citizens, of their theretofore enjoyed voting rights.
Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 347. In Holt, the Court held constitutional state statutes that
created a "statewide system under which Alabama cities exercise extraterritorial
powers[,]" Holt, 439 U.S. at 64, and under which a state "may legitimately restrict the
right to participate in its political processes to those who reside within its borders[,]" id.
at 68-69. The Holt Court reaffirmed the supremacy of the state legislature in setting the
terms for municipal boundary formation and reformation, stating that "a State is afforded
wide leeway when experimenting with the appropriate allocation of state legislative
power. . . . [Hunter v. Pittsburgh] continues to have substantial constitutional
significance in emphasizing the extraordinarily wide latitude that States have in creating
various types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon them." Id. at 71.
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lesser valued property and lesser valued people. As scholars have
pointed out, the role of law in these broader social and economic36
developments tied local government law to the protection of the home. 1
It is therefore possible to conceptualize how the courts were poised to
construe social developments that were perceived to threaten the home as
worthy of legal intervention.
As has been recognized by Gregory Alexander in his article
Takings, Narratives, and Power,137 there are narratives of power
relationships between the parties to a lawsuit that operate below the
abstract doctrinal matters. 38 To paraphrase Alexander, land use and
local government law is generated as much by doctrinal considerations as
it is by pictures and metaphors used by judges to establish normative
conceptions about whose vision of neighborhood and community
deserves judicial sanction and protection. 139 With the demands of a new
economic order built around home ownership and the recognition of the
municipality's police power as sufficient to give local governments
dominion over land use decisions within their borders, there was
considerable context for the development of a legal rhetoric to give the
utmost legitimacy to certain actions.
Rhetoric in the law operates to give practical meaning to concepts
of justice and injustice. This generally involves appeals to a set of
common understandings. At its best, legal rhetoric concretizes abstract
concepts through compelling illustrations of the implications of one
course of action over another. 140 It is impossible to fully comprehend the
import of the evolution of local government law with respect to
municipal boundaries without acknowledging the extent to which courts
have given legal sanction to highly subjective norms about what
constitutes value in a location. Through legal rhetoric, courts have
played an active role in adding legal meaning to location and,
consequently, played a role in the popular conceptions of location risk.
A number of cases illustrate how the courts have adapted to the
economic and social imperatives of location risk in the metropolis.
Whether expanding common law property interpretations to facilitate
suburbanization, gratuitously and unnecessarily opining about normative
visions of land use goals in dicta, or displaying deliberate indifference to
136. See Briffault, Who Rules at Home?, supra note 3, at 395-96.
137. Gregory S. Alexander, Takings, Narratives, and Power, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1752
(1988).
138. See id. at 1752-53.
139. See id.
140. For a broader discussion of the role of rhetoric in the law, see David Fagundes,
PropertyRhetoric and the Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REv. 652, 658-61 (citing James
Boyd White, Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and Communal
Life, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 684, 685 (1985)).
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the excesses of territorially based patterns of protracted race and classbased discrimination, courts have participated in the making of a culture
that views municipal identity as a property right.
A.

Land Use Law and Location Risk

Over the course of the twentieth century, property law evolved to
suit the market realities of suburban development as well as its social
dimensions. One example of this evolution is found in the development
of the law of real covenants. Covenants allowed early twentieth-century
residential subdivision developers to bind future property owners within
a development to certain affirmative duties and acts as well as control
who could live in the development, its architectural and spatial character,
and how these guidelines would be enforced. 14 ' But early in the
residential subdivision boom there emerged questions about the legal
basis for enforcing homeowner association dues on successive property
owners. Specifically, such a covenant was alleged to not satisfy the
"touch and concern" requirement in the common law of covenants.
The Court of Appeals of New York addressed this issue in the 1938
case Neponsit Property Owners' Association, Inc., v. EmigrantIndustrial
Savings Bank.142 In Neponsit, a developer sought to create a covenant
that would require successive purchasers to pay dues to the neighborhood
association. 143 In other words, the covenant required a covenanter to
perform the affirmative act of "pay[ing] money for use in connection
with, but not upon, the land which it is said is subject to the burden of the
covenant." 144 The issue arose as to whether such a "public purposes"
covenant can be said to "touch and concern" the land, a requirement of
the common law of servitudes and real covenants.145 The court held that
"the test [of a covenant] is based on the effect of the covenant rather than
on technical distinctions[,]" specifically46 in reference to the interpretation
of the touch and concern requirement. 1
The court's decision to liberally construe the "touch and concern"
requirement and hold that the law of covenants should be driven by the
effect of the covenant rather than its technical distinctions directly

141. See Gerald Korngold, The Emergence of Private Land Use Controls in LargeScale Subdivisions: The Companion Story to Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 51
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 617, 618 (2001).
142. Neponsit Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Sav. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793
(N.Y. 1938).
143. See id. at 794.
144. Id.at 795.
145. Id.
146. Id.at 796.
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impacted the course of suburbanization. 147 This stretching of the
meaning of the touch and concern requirement was necessary to create
residential communities where property owners could control the actions
of their neighbors beyond the limits of nuisance law and, most
importantly, restrict access to the neighborhood to those with the ability
to pay for such a regulating regime.
The Neponsit neighborhood development was established to be,
among other things, a "highly restricted, well kept and properly
maintained suburban home community[.]' 148 During that time, other
developers were building upscale communities with deed covenants
binding the homeowners to pay maintenance fees to a homeowner

147. See Neponsit, 15 N.E.2d at 795. The court remarked:
There can be no doubt that Neponsit Realty Company intended that the
covenant should run with the land and should be enforceable by a property
owners association against every owner of property in the residential tract
which the realty company was then developing. The language of the covenant
admits of no other construction. Regardless of the intention of the parties, a
covenant will run with the land and will be enforceable against a subsequent
purchaser of the land at the suit of one who claims the benefit of the covenant,
only if the covenant complies with certain legal requirements.
These
requirements rest upon ancient rules and precedents. The age-old essentials of
a real covenant, aside from the form of the covenant, may be summarily
formulated as follows: (1) it must appear that grantor and grantee intended that
the covenant should run with the land; (2) it must appear that the covenant is
one "touching" or "concerning" the land with which it runs; (3) it must appear
that there is "privity of estate" between the promisee or party claiming the
benefit of the covenant and the right to enforce it, and the promisor or party
who rests under the burden of the covenant....
The covenant in this case is intended to create a charge or obligation to pay a
fixed sum of money to be "devoted to the maintenance of the roads, paths,
parks, beach, sewers and such other public purposes as shall from time to time
be determined by the party of the first part [the grantor], its successors or
assigns." It is an affirmative covenant to pay money for use in connection with,
but not upon, the land which it is said is subject to the burden of the covenant.
Does such a covenant "touch" or "concern" the land? These terms are not part
of a statutory definition, a limitation placed by the State upon the power of the
courts to enforce covenants intended to run with the land by the parties who
entered into the covenants. Rather they are words used by courts in England in
old cases to describe a limitation which the courts themselves created or to
formulate a test which the courts have devised and which the courts voluntarily
apply. In truth such a description or test so formulated is too vague to be of
much assistance and judges and academic scholars alike have struggled, not
with entire success, to formulate a test at once more satisfactory and more
accurate. "It has been found impossible to state any absolute tests to determine
what covenants touch and concern land and what do not. The question is one
for the court to determine in the exercise of its best judgment upon the facts of
each case."
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
148. In re Pub. Beach, 199 N.E. 5, 8 (N.Y. 1935).
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association.1 49 While interesting and significant as a doctrinal matter, the
decision's import was to expand the bounds of property law to
accommodate a covenant regime that would allow land developers to
control the character of a residential development beyond the point of
subdivision and transfer. This control was essential for the mass
production of tract housing developments and the guarantee of a stable
neighborhood character and locational value.
The U.S. Supreme Court's land use cases represent the legal
rhetoric upon which contemporary notions of location risk and municipal
identity as property are based. Since its seminal decision in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 15° the Court has deployed legal rhetoric
about the nature and consequences of land development and location in
ways that have given a sense of urgency and grave consequence to who
lives where.
The Euclid decision constitutionalized zoning, which many local
governments were experimenting with in some form or another by the
time the Court took up the matter in 1926.151 In Euclid, the majority
opinion addressed whether the prohibition of various land uses is
permissible under a municipality's police power. 152 This was a
watershed moment for the promotion of land use planning throughout the
nation. But the Euclid Court went beyond just sanctioning zoning; the
Court specifically opined about the types of development it felt were
most conducive to the development of healthy, valuable communities.15
The Euclid Court stated that the crux of the zoning-enabling
legislation at issue was the validity of residential districts "from which
business and trade of every sort, including hotels and apartment houses,
are excluded."' 54 The Court cited with approval state court decisions
opining that the exclusion of buildings from residential zones promoted
the health and safety of children, fire safety, and street traffic
regulations.'
The Court specifically addressed zoning provisions for
apartment homes by citing expert research from the time showing that
apartments retarded the development of detached housing and were "a
mere parasite constructed in order to take advantage of open space and

149. See Stewart E. Sterk, Neponsit Property Owners' Association v. Emigrant
Industrial Savings Bank, in PROPERTY STORIES 301, 303-04 (Gerald Komgold & Andrew
P. Morriss eds., 2004).
150. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). •
151. See MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 26, at 129.
152. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397.
153. See id. at 394-95.
154. Id. at 390.
155. See id. at 391.
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attractive surroundings created by the residential character of the
district."' 5 6 The EuclidCourt remarked:
[T]he coming of one apartment house is followed by others,
interfering by their height and bulk with the free circulation of air and
monopolizing the rays of the sun which otherwise would fall upon
the smaller homes, and bringing, as their necessary accompaniments,
the disturbing noises incident to increased traffic and business, and
the occupation, by means of moving and parked automobiles, of
larger portions of the streets, thus detracting from their safety and
depriving children of the privilege of quiet and open spaces for play,
enjoyed by those in more favored localities-until, finally, the
residential character of the neighborhood and its57desirability as a
place of detached residences are utterly destroyed. 1
In a decision concerned with the line between reasonableness and
arbitrariness, the Court's critique of multi-family housing is quite, well,
arbitrary.
The Court considered apartment houses nuisances in
residential districts designed for single-family detached housing. 58 The
Court took what essentially amounts to a design issue and treated it as a
substantive planning issue. This decision infused the Court's sanctioning
of zoning with highly subjective value judgments, which ultimately set
the stage for the housing development trends behind Neponsit and which
parallels the logic behind the race and 59class-based exclusionary zoning
that would develop later in the century. 1
The Supreme Court's decisions in Euclid in 1926 and in Nectow v.
City of Cambridge160 in 1928 were the last land use decisions rendered
by the Court for almost 50 years before its decision in Village of Belle
6
Terre v. Boraas1
' in 1974.162 In the intervening years, the entire
American landscape was transformed by suburban development. As was
discussed earlier, local government law enabled this transformation with
the devolution of boundary policy from the state down to the local
level. 63 As central cities began to sprawl outward and as new

156. See id. at 394.
157. Euclid,272 U.S. at 394.
158. See id.
159. See, e.g., Batchis, supra note 29, at 5-6 (discussing how the U.S. Supreme
Court's description of apartment housing in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. and its
land use jurisprudence in general contributed to the development of suburban sprawl).
160. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928).

161.

Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).

162. It is important to clarify that several important takings cases were decided
between the Euclid and Belle Terre decisions. While certainly within the ambit of land
use, these takings cases are beyond the scope of this Article.
163. See generally Tyson, supra note 22 (discussing the history of municipal
boundary policy).
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municipalities developed on their outskirts, locals began to demand
greater control over the incorporation or annexation of new territory.
Furthermore, the devolution of boundary policy from the state to the
local level empowered those seeking to stem the tide of racial progress
that characterized twentieth-century social relations and politics.
The growth of suburbs throughout the early twentieth century was
in large measure about creating a separate, protected space for
individuals and families who conformed to certain social and cultural
norms. As a matter of federal and state policy, the white, traditional,
middle-class family was the idealized suburban resident. The 1974 Belle
Terre decision involved the legality of the municipality's definition of
"family" for the purpose of limiting who could occupy housing under its
zoning code. 164 The case essentially involved a quiet bedroom
community taking action to prevent college students from overrunning
its neighborhoods. The ordinance at issue in Belle Terre prohibited
groups of more than two unrelated persons, as distinguished from groups
consisting of any number of persons related by blood, adoption, or
marriage, from occupying a residence within the confines of the
township. 165
In reaching its decision, the Court deployed language and imagery
similar to that in Euclid in service of sanctioning the restrictive zoning
ordinance. The Court understandably acknowledged that in deferring to
the legislative judgment of what constitutes a family in the zoning
ordinance, it was drawing a line that was vulnerable to criticism as
arbitrary. 166 This rather humble acknowledgment is overshadowed,
however, by the Court's curious assessment of what constitutes an urban
problem and what is required to address it. The Court stated:
The regimes of boarding houses, fraternity houses, and the like

present urban problems. More people occupy a given space; more
cars rather continuously pass by; more cars are parked; noise travels
with crowds. A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and
motor vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use
project addressed to family needs. This goal is a permissible
one .... The police power is not confined to elimination of filth,
stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings167
of quiet seclusion and

clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.

164.
165.
166.
167.

See Belle Terre, 416 U.S. at 2-3.
See id. at 2.
See id. at 8 n.5.
Id. at9.
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The Belle Terre decision is essentially about homeowners not
wanting to live next to apartment houses full of raucous college students
and whether it is constitutionally permissible for a municipal zoning
ordinance to make the distinctions in family composition necessary to
prevent fraternity houses or other collegiate residential developments
from ending up in their neighborhoods. Who wouldn't support that?
The question becomes whether an ordinance can be drafted narrowly
enough to address this problem without unnecessarily discriminating
against legitimate housing consumers. These were the tightly drawn
bounds within which the Court had to rule on an issue many might
regard as remarkably unremarkable. But the Court's invocation of
"urban problems" incorporated something beyond the facts of the case; it
went beyond what was required to address whether Belle Terre's zoning
code was narrowly tailored fall within its legitimate police power.
Boarding houses do not necessarily create "urban problems." The
extolling of wide yards, few people, and restricted transportation flow
implies infrastructure costs that inevitably limit the market of potential
residents who can afford to pay for such land use patterns. The majority
deploys this particular illustration to uphold a traditional family
ordinance. In doing so, it introduces subjective, intangible standards that
are most likely to be interpreted and understood in ways that reinforce
the social-control mechanisms that, in a broader sense, zoning is
designed to serve. 68 Through this rhetoric, however, the Court is once
again fueling the specter of location risk in a time of increasing "urban
problems" and white suburban flight.
The Belle Terre Court's idealized view of local government and
suburban land use arrangements not only supports the restrictive goals of
the family composition ordinance, but it also enlists judicial support for
fundamentally ideological and contingent normative conceptions of
spatial organization and the relative risks associated with a given
location. 169 While the notion of location risk and the culture of location
risk mitigation that has driven racist, elitist, environmentally harmful,
and fragmentation-producing development certainly predates the Belle
Terre decision, as this Article has shown, the measure of judicial
sanction and constitutional cover it receives through the majority's
opinion is a stunning example of how legal rhetoric has furthered the
forces that fuel a notion of municipal identity as property.
The Belle Terre decision casts a long shadow over local government
law, and it continues to serve as precedent for similar disputes involving

168. See Richards, supra note 111, at 776-77.
169. See Richards, supra note 111, at 778 (discussing the ideological foundations of
traditional family zoning ordinances).
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the codification of specific family norms. State courts have split on
adopting the reasoning of Belle Terre when deciding whether restrictive
definitions of family in land use ordinances violate their state71
constitutions. 170 In Ames Rental Property Ass'n v. City of Ames,'
another ordinance defining a "family" was challenged as violating the
equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution. The city of Ames, the
home of Iowa State University, passed a zoning ordinance that permitted
single-family dwellings only in certain areas of the city. The ordinance
defined a "family" as any
number of related persons or no more than
72
three unrelated persons.1

The Iowa Supreme Court held that, as in Belle Terre, Ames had a
legitimate interest in promoting and preserving neighborhoods that are
conducive to families. 173 The court found that Ames articulated several
bases for the zoning ordinance, including "'promot[ing] a sense of
community, sanctity of the family, quiet and peaceful neighborhoods,
low population, limited congestion of motor vehicles and controlled
transiency."", 17 4
The Ames court took inventory of the obvious
175
their stated rationale for upholding the ordinance.
to
counterarguments
The court was somewhat dismissive of these concerns, however, stating
that "[c]ertainly this ordinance is imprecise and based on stereotypes.
Nevertheless, it is a reasonable attempt to address concerns by176citizens
who fear living next door to the hubbub of an 'Animal House."",
Richard Briffault aptly analyzed the import of the Belle Terre
decision and others like it in observing that it fosters a suburban view of
local government that sees local government not as an agent of the state
but rather as an agent of local families. 177 Belle Terre is still good law,
and cases like Ames illustrate the enduring quality of its reasoning, the
manner in which it constitutionalized a particular conception of the
family, and how the landscape and local governance should be ordered
around it.

170. See Katia Brener, Note, Belle Terre and Single Family Home Ordinances:
JudicialPerceptionsof Local Government and the Presumption of Validity, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 447,454-63 (1999).

171.
172.
173.
174.

Ames Rental Prop. Ass'n v. City of Ames, 736 N.W.2d 255 (Iowa 2007).
See id. at 257.
See id. at 260.
See id. (alteration in original).

175. See id. at 260-63.
176. See Ames, 736 N.W.2d at 262.
177. See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part Il-Localism and Legal Theory, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 346, 382 (1990) (explaining the suburban model of local government).
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Location Risk Beyond Land Use

Land use cases are not the only site of the courts' willingness to
give legal cover and sanction to a culture of location risk mitigation. The
notion of suburbs as exclusive retreats from inner cities and, more
specifically, inner city public schools, was essentially given
constitutional protection in Milliken v. Bradley.178 By the 1970s, Detroit
was municipally hyper-fragmented, and its constellation of school
districts illustrated the extent to which the metropolitan area was
balkanized. Historians have written considerably about the economic
and social drivers of this fragmentation, and race is indisputably at the
center. Quite possibly no other metropolitan area's growth trajectory and
territorial expansion is better explained through the prism of midtwentieth-century race and class conflict than Detroit's. Issues of
location risk, the relationship between social identity and territory, and
the perceived life chance consequences of proximity to the socially
undesirable are on heightened display in Detroit's metropolitan
history. 179
The Milliken Court posited that a finding of past de jure segregation
by a city in its public schools could not justify remedies imposing duties
on surrounding suburban jurisdictions, even if the noninclusion
predictably would result in greater de facto segregation in the city's
schools.180 The Court was clear that absent a finding that the boundary
lines of any affected school district were established for racially
discriminatory purposes, a federal court could not impose a multi-district
remedy.' 81 It ultimately struck down a federal court-imposed, inter82
district remedy to address racially segregated schools.1
Milliken offered the Court an opportunity to weigh in on the role of
municipal boundaries and their legal significance. In doing so, the Court
specifically rejected the District Court's characterization of school
district boundaries as "'simply matters of political convenience' by
asserting that the "deeply rooted" tradition of local control of schools
meant that school district lines could not be casually ignored. 183 The
Court reiterated its statement from San Antonio School District v.
Rodriguez'84 that "local control over the educational process affords
citizens an opportunity to participate in decision-making, permits the
178.
179.
RACE

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
See generally, e.g., THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF
AND INEQUALITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (2005).

THE URBAN CRISIS:

See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 748-49.
See id. at 748-50.
See id. at 752-53.
See id. at 739, 741-42.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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structuring of school programs to fit local needs, and encourages
experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for educational
excellence."' 85 While the Court was careful to clarify that district lines
are not sacrosanct and can therefore not operate in ways that violate
constitutional rights, it is clear that the Court was willing to give broad
deference to the line drawing that produced the existing1 86boundaries and,
by extension, the racially segregated conditions at issue.
Justice Marshall's dissent in Milliken provided a nuanced view of
the role of boundaries in enfranchising local communities with the ability
to enact legislation that ultimately produces outcomes offensive to
Constitutional liberties. Justice Marshall argued that the school district
lines at issue are "flexible and permeable for a wide variety of purposes,"
underscoring the contingent and political nature of municipal
boundaries.187 He then detailed the many state legislative actions which
systematically shifted funding to Detroit-area suburban municipalities
and suburban school districts and away from the central city.18 8 He also
clarified that, under Michigan law, school districts are not separate,
autonomous entities, contrary to how the majority characterizes them.18 9
This is particularly important given the majority's invocation of the
"deeply rooted" tradition of local control of schools. Justice Marshall
aptly pointed out that the Supreme Court of Michigan has explicitly
defined education as a matter of statewide concern.1 90
Justice Marshall's dissent illuminates the fact that, even in the face
of statutory and jurisprudential guidance to the contrary, the majority
was determined to construe Michigan's school boundaries in a manner
that bolstered the power of local interests and the line drawing that gave
those interests legal legitimacy. Here, legal reasoning is marshaled in
support of the inviolable interest in municipal identity even when the law
says otherwise. Michigan law clearly established that education was a
matter of statewide concern, from which it is possible to deduce that a
metropolitan-area education scheme would be permissible. The Court,
however, drew on a "deeply rooted" tradition in spite of statutory and
jurisprudential guidance to the contrary. Milliken illustrates in stark
detail the lengths to which the Court was willing to go to construct a
history and culture of local control potent enough to trump the legitimacy

185. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 742 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50).
186. See id. at 744.
187. See id. at 783 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
188. See id at 791-92.
189. See id. at 793-94.
190. See Milliken, 418 U.S. at 794-95 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing In re Sch.
Dist. No. 6, Paris & Wyoming Twps., Kent Cnty., 278 N.W. 792, 797 (Mich. 1938)).
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of the inter-district, boundary splitting school segregation remedy
mandated by the District Court.
The Milliken Court gave constitutional sanction to the fragmented,
balkanized consequences of localism and heightened the perception of
risk that justified exiting the school district and city of Detroit in the first
place. The location risk Detroit's exiters imagined was made real by the
disinvestment and insolvency that defined Detroit in the years since their
exit.191 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall wrote, "[I]t may seem
to be the easier course to allow our great metropolitan areas to be divided
up each into two cities--one white, the other black-but it is a course, I
predict, our people ultimately will regret., 192 Marshall's dissent
essentially charged the majority with deliberately denying the race and
class drivers of fragmentation in metropolitan Detroit.
That Milliken and Belle Terre were decided in the same Supreme
Court term and therefore considered by the same Justices and law clerks
also adds texture to their role in forging a notion of municipal identity as
property. On the one hand, the Belle Terre decision suggests not only
that boundaries imbue those who lie within the legitimate power to
express their social fears and biases through the law, but also that the
Court was comfortable with the broader local government and urban
development context within which those decisions are made. The Court
was not only uncritical of the implications of its decision in this regard; it
also took the opportunity to offer its own thoughts about what urban
development norms should be.
The Milliken majority avoided opining on race in the same cavalier
manner as it treated urban development in Belle Terre. By 1974, it was
becoming unfashionable to openly question policies to remediate the
effects of racial discrimination, and Chief Justice Burger's tenure was
marked by a number of decisions which in many ways ushered in a new
period of race-blind rhetoric and thinking on the Court.193 Therefore the
Court had to read into Michigan law a tradition that Justice Marshall
showed simply did not exist. The Court was likely more comfortable
writing extensive dicta about subjective judgments on the sociology of
land development. There, too, Justice Marshall's dissent operates to
expose the holes in the Court's logic and the normative implications of
its thinking. While the Milliken majority is more timid in its rhetoric
than the Belle Terre majority, the import of its logic and the overall
191. See generally SUGRUE, supra note 179.
192. Milliken, 418 U.S. at 815 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193. See Tyson, supra note 73, at 358-59 (exploring how the race-neutral approaches
and discourses of the immediate post-civil rights period are reflected in the race-neutral
logic of decisions like Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), and Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan HousingDevelopment Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977)).
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implications of the opinion are no less reinforcing of the specter of
location risk that has led to contemporary notions of municipal identity
as property.
Both the Belle Terre and Milliken decisions illustrate the Court
wrestling with the capacity for communities to be sovereign. In Belle
Terre, the Court reasoned down to sovereignty-local government is
sovereign because of its specific right to protect the welfare of the
community and the stability of its property values through zoning law as
it sees fit. The Court's logic in this instance required that it construct a
meta-narrative for local autonomy over spatial organization and urban
development, even if doing so required enlisting the most subjective of
judgments and assumptions. In Milliken, the Court reasoned up to
sovereignty-local government is sovereign because of an undeniable
tradition of local control over local schools. The Court's logic in this
instance required that it construct a tradition and custom where one did
not exist statutorily or jurisprudentially. In both decisions, the Court
wanted to protect local sovereignty in big, consequential ways. It wanted
to ensure that boundaries are respected and that the expectations of
power they prop up are immune from attack.
This denial continued in decisions that followed. For instance, in
Goldsboro City Board of Education v. Wayne County Board of
Education,'94 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected a
plan to merge the county and city school systems for the purpose of
achieving racial desegregation.1 95 The court justified its holding by
stating:
The plaintiff has a problem. Yet, its problem is one beyond our
power, in the present state of the law, to correct. The plaintiff's
problem is the result of movement from city to suburbs seen
throughout the United States and the abandonment of public schools
by white, city residents seen in many communities where
desegregation has occurred. We are not at present charged with a
responsibility to remedy problems caused by demography and private
racism. 196
In addition to its recognition of demography, the court could have
very well included cartography as being in association with private
racism and the metropolitan area problems that flow from the confluence
of those forces. Furthermore, the court essentially acknowledged that the
municipal boundary problem is the result of private racism beyond the
194. Goldsboro City Bd. of Educ. v. Wayne Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 745 F.2d 324 (4th
Cir. 1984).
195. See id. at 333.
196. Id. (emphasis added).
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law's power to reach and to which the law must submit. This stands in
contrast to Belle Terre's willingness to enlist municipal boundaries to
protect and sanction other biases. 197
All of these cases deploy legal rhetoric and legal reasoning that give
legitimacy and constitutional cover to the imagined location risk that,
through the behavior that these cases and other social developments
encourage, becomes a real risk with real consequences. This perceived
and made-real notion of location risk bolsters the notion of municipal
identity as property. Municipal identity as property elevates the right to
separate location through municipal boundaries to a right akin to that of a
property right. Property rights rhetoric is then deployed to express and
defend that right. The associated discourse and meanings shift the
burden of remedying the harm caused by this idea from those expressing
such rights to those negatively affected by them.
V.

POST-SCRIPT ON BOUNDARIES AND DETROIT'S FISCAL CRISIS

Bankruptcy filings by municipalities under Chapter 9198 of the
Bankruptcy Code are rare. 199 Municipalities in financial distress can file
for a Chapter 9 bankruptcy and receive immediate relief from creditor
collection efforts. Chapter 9 bankruptcy provides a framework within
which municipalities can negotiate a restructuring of their debt
obligations.20 0 Chapter 9 automatically triggers a stay against creditor
collection efforts. 20 A municipality can continue to provide basic public
services while negotiating a debt adjustment plan with its creditors.20 2

197. Richard Ford criticizes this logic in Milliken by exposing the flawed
public/private distinction upon which the logic relies. See Richard T. Ford, Geography
and Sovereignty: JurisdictionalFormation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV.
1365, 1388 (1997). He calls the description of privately chosen racism an abandonment
of the responsibility to remedy past discrimination and asserts that, as a matter of
causation, one cannot neatly sever private choice from government imposition since
government helps to create the context within which the private choices occur. Id. Ford
characterizes the jurisdictional structure established by Milliken as allowing for a
convenient exit option that is the background rule that created white flight. Id. He
rightly asserts that this structure is not a neutral space within which people make private
choices; rather, it is an active government policy that encourages segregation and
undermines desegregation efforts. Id.
198. See I IU.S.C. §§ 901-946 (2012).
199. See Frederick Tung, After Orange County: Reforming California Municipal
Bankruptcy Law, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 885, 886 (2002).
200. See 11 U.S.C. § 922 (2012); see also Hannah Heck, Comment, Solving Insolvent
Public Pensions: The Limitations of the Current Bankruptcy Option, 28 EMoRY BANKR.
DEV. J. 89, 102 (2011).
201. See 11 U.S.C. § 922 (2012); see also Heck, supra note 200, at 101.
202. See id. at 893.
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MUNICIPAL IDENTITY AS PROPERTY

Detroit's Chapter 9 bankruptcy filing of July 18, 2013, makes it the
largest American city to ever file for municipal bankruptcy.2 3 The $18
billion Detroit owes also makes this filing the largest municipal
bankruptcy in American history in terms of debt.2° Michigan Governor
Rick Snyder stated that the decision to file for bankruptcy came in the
wake of 60 years of decline for the city, a period in which reality was
often ignored.20 5
Many factors contributed to Detroit's fiscal crisis, including a
shrinking tax base, overwhelming health care and pension costs,
managing debt by borrowing, five consecutive years of annual deficits in
the city's operating budget, and dysfunctional city services.20 6 There are
so many factors that it is difficult to single out or prioritize one over the
others. As of this writing, it is still unclear how the city will be able to
resolve its long-running insolvency.
Years of suburban flight also loom large in this narrative, however,
and Michigan's policies on municipal incorporation and annexation have
systematically led to one of the most fragmented metropolises in the
nation. 207 As the bankruptcy proceedings unfold, it doesn't appear that
the Court will consider the impact of state boundary law on Detroit's
fiscal crisis and bankruptcy. Just as Chapter 9 provides a tool for the
adjustment of a municipality's ongoing contractual obligations, it might
also be possible for the Bankruptcy Code to include methods of redress
for state boundary laws that unfairly and unnecessarily lead to central
city financial instability. Given the recent bankruptcies of municipal
counties and urban centers alike, certain conditions would likely have to
apply in order to determine which situations would warrant a
reconsideration of state boundary law. But given the strong linkages
between boundary elasticity, municipal incorporation activity, and
municipal fiscal strength, it may be necessary2° to consider boundary
policies in the course of a municipal bankruptcy. 0
Such an inquiry would require treatment in a separate article, but it
underscores the consequential nature of boundary law and the fiscal

203. See Monica Davey & Mary Williams Walsh, Billions in Debt, Detroit Tumbles
into Insolvency, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2013, http://nyti.ms/1ldROpx.
204. See Davey & Walsh, supra note 203; Matthew Dolan, Record Bankruptcyfor
Detroit, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2013, http://on.wsj.com/lo4RWKq; Michael A. Fletcher,
Detroit Goes Bankrupt, Largest Municipal Filing in US. History, WASH. POST, July 18,
2013, http://bit.ly/11M1POu.
205. Nancy Kaffer et al., Detroit Filesfor Bankruptcy Protection, USA TODAY, July
18, 2013, http://usat.ly/LlDok3.
206. See Fletcher, supra note 204.
207. See generally Tyson, supra note 22.
208. See id. (discussing the correlation between municipal bond ratings and boundary
elasticity).
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health of the metropolis. As Detroit's bankruptcy continues to unfold,
these and other questions will likely dominate critical thinking on the
matter.
VI. CONCLUSION

It is impossible to disconnect the present experience and enjoyment
of the metropolis from the past and current injustices which fueled the
logic of its organization. The assertion of any fundamental right to
separate community (and the support of statutory changes to make
forming separate communities easier) is essentially a defense of those
injustices. The guiding logic of the metropolis should seek territorial
organization principles that vigorously promote shared social obligations
and linked fate. State laws must change to do just that. The notion of
municipal identity as property weakens any conception of local
government in the metropolis as a collective as opposed to a privatized
enterprise. The deep psychosocial investment many have in municipal
identity threatens to undermine the benefits of the metropolis. Municipal
boundaries implicate interests that are too fundamental to the fate of
communities, the environment, and the distribution of resources within
metropolitan regions to be left to the self-interest driven ethos of
localism.
"Property rights serve human values. ' ' 209 Likewise, municipal
boundary policy is the lynchpin in the expression of human values
through spatial organization and redistributive government. Just as
property law has long embraced the inherent tension between individual
liberty and collective liberty in regulating property, localism must yield
to statewide boundary policies that seek governance regime uniformity
over the largest territorial footprint reasonably possible to ensure that the
redistributional impact of local government taxing policy and power is
equitably shared.

209.

State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 372 (N.J. 1971).

